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TERMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
Consultees Organisations which made representations and provided evidence 
 to the STRB
ASCL Association of School and College Leaders
ATL  Association of Teachers and Lecturers 
BATOD  British Association of Teachers of the Deaf 
DfE/the Department for Education 
Department 
four unions ATL, NUT, UCAC and Voice
GW Governors Wales
head teacher  National Association of Head Teachers and Association of School
unions and College Leaders
NAHT  National Association of Head Teachers
NASUWT  National Association of Schoolmasters Union of Women Teachers 
NEOST National Employers’ Organisation for School Teachers 
NGA  National Governors’ Association 
NUT  National Union of Teachers 
Secretary of Secretary of State for Education 
State 
six unions ASCL, ATL, NAHT, NUT, UCAC and Voice
UCAC  Undeb Cenedlaethol Athrawon Cymru




AGR Association of Graduate Recruiters
ASHE Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings
AST Advanced Skills Teacher
CIPD Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development
CPD Continuing Professional Development
ET Excellent Teacher
HESA Higher Education Statistics Agency
HMT HM Treasury
HR Human Resources
IDS Incomes Data Services
IES Institute for Employment Studies
ITT Initial Teacher Training
LA Local Authority
iv
Management former allowances, providing five levels of payment for additional 
Allowances responsibilities
MPS main scale
NCSL National College for School Leadership
NLE National Leader of Education
NPQH National Professional Qualification for Headship
NQT  Newly Qualified Teacher
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
Ofsted Office for Standards in Education, Children’s Services and Skills
OME Office of Manpower Economics
ONS Office for National Statistics
ORC Infogroup/ORC International
R&R recruitment and retention payments
‘rarely cover’ a condition of teachers’ employment that requires them to  
 provide cover for another class ‘only rarely’
RIG former Rewards and Incentives Group (which comprised: ASCL, 
 ATL, the Department for Children, Schools and Families, NAHT, 
 NASUWT, NEOST and Voice.)
SEN Special Educational Needs
STPCD/ the DfE (2012) School Teachers’ Pay and Conditions 
Document Document and Guidance on School Teachers’ Pay and  
 Conditions, TSO
STRB/ School Teachers’ Review Body 
Review Body
TLR Teaching and Learning Responsibility payment
Unattached Teacher who does not work for a particular school, is employed 
teacher otherwise than at a school, or in a pupil referral unit
UPS upper pay scale
UQT Unqualified Teacher scale
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THE SCHOOL TEACHERS’ REVIEW BODY 
Our role
The School Teachers’ Review Body (STRB) was established in 1991 as 
an independent body to examine and report on such matters relating to 
the statutory conditions of employment of school teachers in England and 
Wales as may from time to time be referred to it by the Secretary of State. 
STRB reports to the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State. The legal 
foundation for the function and work of STRB is Part Eight of the Education 
Act 2002. The secretariat for STRB is provided by the Office of Manpower 
Economics (OME).
The members of STRB are:








The Secretary of State asked us to consider wide-ranging changes to the teacher 
pay framework, focusing on three issues: market-facing pay; more effectively 
linking pay progression and performance; and wider reforms to support the 
recruitment and retention of high quality teachers. 
Our recommendations need to be seen as a package, offering schools a better 
framework for responding to local needs, and rewarding teachers in line with 
their contribution. We propose:
•	  A pay framework that seeks to raise the status of the profession, support 
professional development, and reward individuals in line with their 
contribution to improving pupil outcomes, enabling the most successful 
teachers to progress faster than at present on the basis of annual 
appraisal.
•	  Greater autonomy for schools to set teachers’ pay within a broad national 
framework, enabling schools to respond better to pupil need in the 
context of their local circumstances.
•	  Recognised career stages for teachers, alongside increased 
accountability for high professional standards and contribution to pupil 
progress, comparable to requirements in other graduate professions.
These changes are designed to encourage high calibre graduates and career-
changers to come into teaching and to help schools facing the greatest 
challenges – including in areas with high levels of deprivation – to tailor pay so 
as to attract and retain those teachers who can make the greatest impact on 
pupils’ progress. They are also intended to enable existing teachers to develop 
and improve their teaching skills.
In framing our recommendations we drew on a wide range of evidence, 
including international practice in successful school systems, experience from 
other organisations who recruit graduate professionals and the views of school 
leaders and the teacher unions. Our key recommendations for change are:
•	  Replacement of increments based on length of service by differentiated 
progression through the main scale to reward excellence and 
performance improvement.
•	  Extension to all teachers of pay progression linked to annual appraisal 
(which is already established for more senior teachers). Appraisal should 
be against a single set of teacher standards and individual objectives, 
with a strong emphasis on professional development. 
•	  Abolition of mandatory pay points within the pay scales for classroom 
teachers, to enable individual pay decisions, but with retention at 
present of points for reference only in the main scale, to guide career 
expectations for entrants to the profession.
•	  Retention of a broad national framework, including the higher pay bands 
for London and fringe areas and an upper pay scale as a career path for 
experienced teachers who make a wider contribution in the school.
•	  Replacement of the unnecessarily detailed threshold test for progression 
from the main to the upper pay scale, with simple criteria based on one 
set of teacher standards. This will create a consistent progression path 
from graduate entry to the top of the upper pay scale and allow schools 
to promote the best teachers more rapidly.
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•	  Local flexibility for schools to create posts paying salaries above the 
upper pay scale, enabling some of the very best teachers to remain in 
the classroom and lead the improvement of teaching skills.
•	  More discretion for schools in the use of allowances for recruitment and 
retention and freedom to pay fixed-term responsibility allowances of up 
to £2,500 a year for time-limited projects. 
•	  Reinforcement of the responsibility of head teachers to manage staff and 
resources and of governing bodies to hold school leaders to account for 
managing and rewarding the performance of teachers in the interests of 
pupils.
•	  On the basis of the above, a much simplified School Teachers’ Pay and 
Conditions Document, including a brief guide to the national framework 
and the flexibilities open to schools.
These recommendations are designed to make it easier to meet the local 
needs of schools, reward and promote good teachers, ensure accountability 
at a local level for the quality of teaching and to raise the status of teaching 
as a profession. The freedom to develop pay policies which take account of 
a school’s specific circumstances should encourage school leaders to take 
ownership of pay as a tool for improving pupil outcomes.
Whilst these changes are being introduced, the retention of a broad national 
framework will help guide expectations for entrants to the profession, inform 
career planning and provide a framework for teachers to progress in their 
careers. Combined with increased autonomy to set pay, it will allow schools 
to respond to local needs and to reward individuals on the basis of their 
achievements whilst protecting against pay drift. We suggest there may be 
scope for further flexibility as schools gain experience of managing within a 
more flexible pay framework. We also emphasise the importance of keeping 
under review the evidence of pressure on both starting and median salaries for 
the profession to ensure they remain competitive as the economy recovers, so 
that schools can attract and retain the high quality teachers the nation needs to 
improve pupil outcomes.
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Introduction and background to the remit
Introduction
1.1 Our role, set out in the Education Act 2002, is to consider and report 
to the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State on matters referred to us on 
teachers’ pay and conditions. In his remit letter of 21 February 2012, the 
Secretary of State asked us to consider three issues:
•	 how the pay framework should best be made more market-facing in local 
areas;
•	 how the pay scales, including the main and upper pay scales, should 
be reformed to more effectively link pay and performance, including 
arrangements for progression; and
•	 what other reforms should be made to teachers’ pay and conditions 
in order to raise the status of the profession and best support the 
recruitment and retention of high quality teachers in all schools.
1.2 The Secretary of State’s remit letter, reproduced in Appendix A, asked us 
to report on these matters by 28 September, a deadline subsequently extended 
by a month following the delayed submission of the Government’s evidence. 
The remit letter asked us to have particular regard to six detailed considerations 
when making our recommendations, and listed a further six additional factors to 
take into account on local pay.
1.3 The focus of our consideration has been on pay for classroom teachers as 
we had clear evidence on the main issues to be addressed. We have not made 
any recommendations on leadership pay this remit but emphasise the need 
for consistency across the profession. We would therefore welcome a remit to 
consider leadership pay in the near future and comment briefly on the issues in 
Chapter 7.
1.4 In this chapter, we set out the background to our remit and outline the 
structure of this report.
Background to our remit 
1.5 In May 2010 the Government set out its ambition to reform teachers’ pay 
and conditions in the Coalition Agreement: 
We will reform the existing rigid national pay and conditions rules to give 
schools greater freedoms to pay good teachers more and deal with poor 
performance 1. 
1.6 The Secretary of State confirmed this intention in his letter of 
27 October 2010 to our previous Chair, Dr Anne Wright CBE2 about the remit 
for our Twentieth report, and subsequently in the White Paper, The Importance 
of Teaching3. In this document he set out his priorities for school improvement.
1 HM Government (2010) The Coalition: our programme for government page 29
2 STRB (2011) Twentieth Report, TSO (Cm 8037) Appendix A
3 DfE (2010) The Importance of Teaching The Schools White Paper 2010, TSO (Cm 7980) paragraph 2.31
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1.7 Our current remit is taking place against the background of wider 
Government policies impacting across the public sector, including a two-year 
pay freeze on pay scales (except for those earning £21,000 or less) and pension 
reforms, which for teachers and other workforces include substantially increased 
employee contributions payable from April 2012.
1.8 In the Autumn Statement last year, the Chancellor said he would ask 
independent Pay Review Bodies to consider how public sector pay can be made 
more responsive to local labour markets 4. He subsequently wrote to the Chairs 
of four pay review bodies5 asking them to consider how to make pay more 
market-facing in local areas for their respective workforces. His letter to STRB 
is reproduced at Appendix B. He also announced that public sector pay awards 
would average 1% in each of the two years following the pay freeze. 
1.9 The wider context for our remit includes recognition by successive 
Secretaries of State of the importance of improving the quality of teaching 
to enable the best possible pupil outcomes; and of giving greater freedom 
and independence to head teachers and governing bodies, within a clear 
accountability framework6. The 2005 White Paper signalled the potential for 
Trust schools7 to seek additional flexibilities on pay and conditions to help raise 
standards. It also stressed the importance of rewarding those who contribute 
most:
we will make performance management more effective. The greatest 
rewards and promotion throughout a teacher’s career will go to those who 
make the biggest impact on pupils’ progress and who show commitment 
to the development of themselves and their colleagues 8.
1.10 We have for some time been advocating modernisation of the teachers’ 
pay framework to bring it into line with expectations and practices of graduate 
professions more generally. In previous STRB reports we have commented 
on the need for reform of various aspects of the teachers’ pay and conditions 
framework, including the need to establish a stronger link between performance 
and progression. For example, in our Sixteenth Report we recommended:
all progression on incremental scales should follow a performance 
management review and determination…that the individual teacher’s 
performance has satisfied an explicit performance-related criterion for pay 
progression in the STPCD 9.
1.11 We set out more fully in subsequent chapters previous STRB comments 
relevant to the current proposals for reform.
Conduct of our review 
1.12 We considered, and critically analysed, a wide body of research evidence 
relevant to the remit, including international studies and academic research 
which focused on teaching. We also considered generic studies on pay which 
the Office of Manpower Economics (OME) commissioned for the benefit of all 
4 HM Treasury (2011) Autumn Statement 2011, TSO (Cm 8231) paragraph 1.110
5 Letter from the Chancellor of the Exchequer to the Chairs of NHS PRB, Prison Service PRB, Senior Salaries Review 
Body and School Teachers’ Review Body 7 December 2011 (see Appendix B)
6 DfES (2004) Five Year Strategy for Children and Learners, TSO (Cm 6272)
7 Trust schools are state-funded foundation schools which receive extra support (usually non-monetary) from a 
charitable trust made up of partners working together for the benefit of the school
8 DfES (2005) Higher Standards, Better Schools For All, TSO (Cm 6677) paragraph 8.8
9 STRB (2007) Sixteenth Report, TSO (Cm 7007) paragraph 6.39
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pay review bodies. In anticipation of a remit on freedoms and flexibilities, in 
2010 we also commissioned research to explore the views of head teachers and 
chairs of governing bodies on a range of issues relating to the system of pay and 
reward. 
1.13 In line with our obligations under the Education Act 2002, we invited 
STRB’s statutory consultees to submit written representations and offered a 
list of questions that we thought consultees might find helpful when preparing 
their responses, given the wide-ranging remit. These questions are set out in 
Appendix D and a full list of consultees is at Appendix E. We also provided 
consultees with an opportunity to comment on others’ submissions.
1.14 We held oral representation sessions with the main teacher and head 
teacher unions to explore their concerns and issues raised by others’ evidence. 
We also heard oral representations from the Department, including the Secretary 
of State; the Welsh Government; employer representatives (NEOST) and the 
National Governors’ Association. We have set out in the relevant chapter key 
points made by consultees in written and oral representations. However, given 
the number of consultees involved and the comprehensive submissions offered, 
we do not aim in the report to give a full account of all the views and evidence. 
Rather, we seek to provide a fair reflection of the key thrust of points made in 
submissions and during oral representations.
1.15 This remit has been challenging in light of its scope and the delay in 
receiving evidence from the Department. Despite this, we were able to draw on 
work previously commissioned and to re-organise our timetable to run a robust 
process, and are grateful to consultees for their forbearance and co-operation.
1.16 We are also very grateful to those schools and local authorities we have 
visited recently. As we have noted in previous reports, such visits provide 
practical insights and give a greater depth to our understanding of the issues 
facing teachers in their working lives.
Structure of this report
1.17 Our recommendations on the three remit matters need to be seen as a 
package which offers greater autonomy for schools to reward teachers in line 
with their contribution to school objectives, and to respond to local needs and 
conditions, within a broad national framework. Our recommendations provide in 
particular for:
•	 flexibility for schools to recruit and reward talented teachers in the 
context of local labour markets using the broad framework of the four 
existing geographic pay bands and more flexible recruitment and 
retention allowances;
•	 a closer link between pay progression and individual performance, 
enabling teachers to progress more quickly where their performance and 
contribution to the school justifies it, with an emphasis on professional 
development for teachers at each stage of their career; and
•	 a career path for those teachers who wish to stay in the classroom, as 
well as for those who aspire to leadership roles. 
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1.18 We refer throughout this report to ‘schools’. However, some 2.4%10 of 
teachers, known as ‘unattached teachers’, are centrally employed by local 
authorities. All references to schools‘ actions on pay and appraisal should 
therefore be read as including local authorities where they directly manage the 
pay and appraisal of unattached teachers.
1.19 Our report aims to provide a clear evidence base and rationale for our 
overall package of recommendations, whilst examining the specific issues on 
which the remit focused. The structure is as follows: 
•	 Chapter 2 provides an overview of the evidence, including that from 
international, academic and specialist pay studies. It also summarises 
other evidence and consultees’ views relating to broad issues 
concerning the teachers’ pay system. It goes on to set out the guiding 
principles we developed on teachers’ pay which underpin our overall 
recommendations.
•	 Chapters 3, 4 and 5 deal respectively with the three elements of our 
remit:
• Chapter 3 focuses on the geographical dimension of market-
facing pay including the evidence on public and private sector 
pay comparisons and practice in other organisations. Our 
recommendations here should be read in conjunction with proposals 
in Chapters 4 and 5 which provide for greater local flexibility on 
progression and allowances.
• Chapter 4 examines the evidence on linking pay and performance, 
including progression and sets out our recommendations for change. 
Our proposals here should be read in the context of our wider 
comments on raising the status of teaching with a strong focus on 
professional development for teachers at all stages of their career. 
• Chapter 5 looks at wider proposals for increasing flexibility in the 
pay system. We also emphasise the importance of simplification 
of the School Teachers’ Pay and Conditions Document (STPCD) to 
enable head teachers and governing bodies to make decisions with 
confidence.
•	 Chapter 6 draws together our overall conclusions on the case for greater 
autonomy on pay for schools at a local level. We make observations on 
capacity within the current system to deal with the changes proposed, 
including effective performance appraisal, leadership and governance.
•	 Chapter 7 considers the overall teacher supply picture, in line with 
our commitment in the Twentieth Report to monitor trends during the 
pay freeze11. We also look ahead to the next remit and comment on 
the scope to consider extending flexibility in other areas of the pay 
framework in future.
10 OME analysis of DfE and Welsh Government statistics
11 STRB (2011) Twentieth Report, TSO (Cm 8037) paragraph 5.4
5CHAPTER 2
Overview of the evidence, our broad analysis and 
guiding principles
2.1 In this chapter, we review the wider evidence and consultees’ views on the 
approach to reward in teaching and other organisations. We draw on this broad 
evidence base to inform our analysis and set out our guiding principles for this 
remit.
The evidence base
2.2 We have examined evidence from a wide range of sources including 
international evidence from OECD and others, academic research and a recent 
report of the House of Commons Education Committee. These sources were 
valuable supplements to the more focused evidence we sought for this remit 
which, as we set out in the previous chapter, included independent research 
commissioned for us by OME. In addition, we considered the Department’s own 
proposals and substantial submissions from statutory consultees, whose views 
we explored in oral evidence sessions. 
2.3 We have drawn on this extensive evidence base in considering the case 
for reform of the pay system, including seeking to understand what works best 
in practice in other organisations and to explore a range of possible alternative 
approaches. It is clear from the evidence that high quality teaching depends 
on a number of factors which need to be taken together. We recognise the 
limitations of individual pieces of evidence and that they can be open to 
varied interpretation. In particular, we note that international evidence needs 
interpreting with some care because of the country-specific cultural and 
economic considerations which impact on educational outcomes. We have 
sought to make a balanced assessment, taking account of the full range of 
evidence and of our wider understanding of the operational issues which face 
schools on the ground.
International, academic and policy research
2.4 We set out below the main sources of international, academic and policy 
research we drew on and summarise their key findings. In reviewing these 
sources we observed some consistent themes:
•	 The quality of teaching is central to delivering pupil outcomes.
•	 The status of the profession is important and successful countries are 
able to draw their teaching recruits from the highest calibre pools of 
candidates. 
•	 To attract high quality candidates pay levels need to be competitive 
against other graduate professions. While general levels of pay are 
important, so is the flexibility to adjust pay to address localised labour 
market challenges.
•	 Teachers’ effectiveness can be assessed although this is not 
straightforward and clear frameworks for assessment are required. 
62.5 These themes were reflected in recent studies from the OECD. Its recent 
report Preparing Teachers and Developing Leaders for the 21st Century1, 
based on research on its member countries, included the following important 
observations: 
•	 The most successful systems provide excellent teaching for all students. 
In order to achieve this, they attract high quality graduates equitably 
across the school system.
•	 Policy responses are needed at two levels to ensure the supply and 
retention of high quality staff. The first seeks to improve the profession’s 
general status and competitive position in the job market. The second 
involves more targeted responses and incentives for particular types of 
teacher shortage, which recognises there is not a single labour market 
for teachers, but a set of them, distinguished by school type and 
characteristics such as subject specialisation.
•	 Some countries are moving to open more career opportunities for 
teachers, spurred, in part, by the greater variety of school roles with 
significant decision-making responsibilities.
•	 To attract the most talented teachers to the most challenging 
classrooms, important strategies include: competitive compensation and 
other incentives such as career prospects, giving teachers responsibility 
as professionals, high quality continuing professional development, 
opportunity to gain experience outside schools through sabbatical leave, 
extended leave without pay, and job exchanges with industry.
•	 Many education systems have granted significantly more discretion to 
school heads and faculties, something that teachers often refer to as a 
factor contributing to the attractiveness of the teaching profession.
2.6 The OECD’s Building a High-Quality Teaching Profession – Lessons from 
around the World 2 report made the following observations on teacher evaluation 
and compensation:
•	 Performance-based rewards imply rewarding something more than 
credentials and years of experience, which themselves have been shown 
to be weak indicators of teacher effectiveness.
•	 It is possible to evaluate effective teaching, linked with improved 
student results, thus making it possible, in principle, to include 
evaluations of both teacher performance and student performance as 
part of a teacher compensation scheme.
•	 Measures of teacher performance need to be valid, reliable and agreed 
by teachers themselves to be fair and accurate. These can include 
multiple observations and contributions to school specific improvement 
efforts.
•	 Surveys show that teachers welcome appraisal and feedback and many 
report that a good appraisal too often does not lead to any recognition or 
reward.
2.7 An earlier report3 focused on policies that would contribute to attracting, 
developing and retaining effective teachers. It examined indicators of teacher 
quality and reported research suggesting that while there is a positive 
1 OECD (2012) Preparing Teachers and Developing School Leaders for the 21st Century Lessons from around the 
World
2 OECD (2011) Building a High-Quality Teaching Profession – Lessons from around the World 
3 OECD (2005) Teachers Matter: Attracting, Developing and Retaining Effective Teachers – Overview
7relationship between measured teachers’ characteristics (such as qualifications 
and experience) and student performance, it is weaker than might be expected. 
The report emphasised the importance of effective teacher evaluation and 
continuous professional development in sustaining teacher quality. 
2.8 We also note that a 2012 summary document from OECD on 
performance-related pay4 was widely quoted on publication. Comparing 37 
countries at aggregate level, it found no relationship between pupil performance 
and the use of pay systems with performance-based elements. However, it 
acknowledged the difficulty inherent in such empirical analyses because data 
are scarce and many aspects need to be considered, including how performance 
is defined and measured and the scale of the reward. We note that the report 
cited England as using outstanding teaching performance as a criterion for 
decisions on a teacher’s position on the base salary scale. Whilst there are 
established arrangements for performance-related progression to and within the 
upper pay scale, the current provisions to award higher starting salaries or an 
additional increment on the main scale are rarely used in practice. For example, 
data for 2008/09 show that some 98% of teachers on the main scale received a 
single increment5. This underlines the need for caution in interpreting this type 
of analysis. 
2.9 A recent report on teacher impacts in the UK for the Sutton Trust6 argued 
that teacher effectiveness was very difficult to predict without classroom 
observation. It proposed that pay progression should be based on improvement 
in classroom results, reviews by head teachers and external appraisal. The 
report recommended testing a policy where teachers should be able to opt out 
of the current system and into a more radical system of performance-based 
progression.
2.10 A number of consultees have noted developments in Sweden, where a 
system of locally determined individual based pay was introduced in 1995 
to coincide with wider decentralisation reforms. The new system included 
provision for performance-related pay. DfE’s evidence to us cited a number of 
observations made by the OECD in its 2011 report on Sweden7. 
2.11 The report noted that Sweden’s individualised pay system meant that 
employers and school leaders could potentially make salary decisions contingent 
on evidence of good performance and allowed schools to better value those 
competencies that best fit their needs. However, it observed that important 
aspects of implementation, such as the way the performance of teachers was 
assessed and what the system actually rewarded, raised concerns about the 
ability of the system to provide teachers with the incentives to improve their 
performance. In practice, OECD saw the system as being predominantly used 
as an instrument to meet recruitment needs and to reward teacher commitment 
and additional tasks rather than as a means to reward the performance of 
teachers. 
2.12 The OECD concluded that the major reason school leaders in Sweden 
were deterred from establishing a closer linkage between pay and performance 
was the absence of a clear framework for evaluating the performance 
4 OECD (2012) PISA in Focus 16: Does performance-based pay improve teaching?
5 ORC (2009) Survey of Teachers’ Pay 2008, OME
6 Sutton Trust (2011) Improving the impact of teachers on pupil achievements in the UK – interim findings page 3
7 OECD (2011) OECD Reviews of Evaluation and Assessment in Education, Sweden
8of teachers. It specifically noted the absence of profession-wide agreed 
competence standards for teachers, a shared understanding of ‘accomplished 
teaching’ and agreed procedures and instruments for evaluating the 
performance of teachers. We note from the report that the Swedish authorities 
are now addressing these issues and that a new system of teacher registration 
will include a framework of professional standards for the teaching profession.
2.13 Research reported by McKinsey8 in 2010 noted that school systems 
in Singapore, Finland and South Korea, which have good pupil outcomes by 
international standards at all levels, recruit 100% of their teachers from the 
top third of students, defined academically, and screen for other important 
characteristics, such as motivation, commitment and communications skills. 
Both Singapore and South Korea pay competitively, though Finland less so. The 
pay system in Singapore includes provision for merit-based increments and both 
retention and performance bonuses while South Korea has experimented with 
performance bonuses.
2.14 Other studies have underlined the importance of a high status for the 
teaching profession. According to Barber and Mourshed9, strong competition 
for entry into teaching is linked with high status for the profession, which, in 
turn, attracts high quality graduates (e.g. in Finland and South Korea). Dolton 
and Gutierrez10 underlined the importance of relative earnings in improving the 
status of teaching and suggested that increasing teacher salaries (and the speed 
at which they can reach higher pay levels within a particular pay structure) 
would help schools to recruit and retain the higher ability teachers that schools 
need to offer all pupils a high quality education. 
2.15 In a range of articles11, Eric Hanushek noted that the quality of teachers 
is the most important determinant of student achievement but that in the 
USA teacher salaries have declined dramatically in relation to the rest of the 
economy since 1940 and that the best graduates were not entering teaching. 
He contrasted this with Finland and South Korea, which both attract top 
graduates into teaching. He further observed that teachers’ salaries are weakly 
related to ‘productivity’, noting that teachers’ salaries frequently increase 
by degree and years of experience, but that neither is related to teacher 
effectiveness.
2.16 Other studies have suggested that greater benefits would be gained 
through a freeing up of the regulated system of pay. In a report on academy 
schools, Reform12 suggested that despite their greater freedoms, many were 
being held back by the continued regulation of the rest of the school system. 
It suggested that national frameworks on curriculum and pay and conditions 
inhibited some academies from innovating in these areas and called for the 
Government to remove these ‘cultural and regulatory barriers to autonomy and 
innovation’. 
8 McKinsey & Company (2011) Closing the talent gap: Attracting and retaining top-third graduates to careers in 
teaching 
9 Cited in McKinsey & Company (2011) How the world’s best-performing school systems come out on top
10 Dolton, P and Marcenaro–Gutierrez,O (2011) Teachers’ pay and pupil performance in CentrePiece, Autumn 2011, 
Centre for Economic Performance at LSE
11 Hanushek (2011) Valuing Teachers: How much is a good teacher worth in Education Next, Summer 2011; 
Hanushek (2011), The economic value of higher teacher quality in Economics of Education Review 30 (2011) 
466 – 479
12 Reform/The Schools Network (2012) Plan A+ Unleashing the potential of academies
92.17 In a recently published study on pay regulation and school performance, 
Britton and Propper conducted an analysis of the relationship between average 
earnings and pupil outcomes across local authorities13. They found that 
secondary schools located in areas with high average earnings added less value 
between key stage 2 and key stage 4 than those located in areas with lower 
average pay, and that these losses were not offset by the gains in the lower wage 
areas. They attribute this finding to the regulation of teachers’ pay such that 
teachers are relatively worse-off in areas where average earnings are high and 
that this has an adverse effect on the educational outcomes for their pupils. We 
comment on this study in Chapter 3.
Pay and progression practice in other organisations
2.18 Most private and many public sector organisations operate pay systems 
that include provision for pay progression that is linked to some measure of 
performance. The 2012 Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development 
Survey of Reward Management showed that individual performance-related 
pay was being used by almost three times as many organisations as length of 
service, including around 90% of private sector and over half of public sector 
employers. By contrast, length of service as a factor in determining pay was 
much more prevalent in the public sector and only used by a minority of private 
sector employers14. 
2.19 The OME commissioned research last year on behalf of all pay review 
bodies to examine approaches to pay progression used in the wider economy15. 
The report observed that private sector companies had generally made changes 
away from time-served incremental systems earlier than the public sector and 
tended to be more radical in their approach. The scale of the changes varied by 
sector and size of organisation, and by occupation and seniority of employment. 
Professional and senior roles were most likely to progress according to their 
performance. 
2.20 The research took the form of case-studies in a range of organisations 
making changes to their systems and was intended to illuminate the practical 
issues and learning from their experiences. The case-study organisations 
included several with significant numbers of graduate level posts, whose pay 
and progression systems had undergone significant transition in recent years.
2.21 The studies evidenced a range of reasons for changing progression 
arrangements and some common objectives were:
•	 Appropriately recognising the highest performers.
•	 Offering continued scope for pay progression to boost motivation and 
retention. 
•	 Recognising through pay progression achievement towards organisational 
objectives.
•	 Achieving transparency and equality in pay progression systems. 
2.22 The case-study organisations had moved away from time-served 
incremental scales to performance, contribution-related or market-related 
pay systems which provided scope for differential levels of pay. The authors 
identified the following key issues from the studies:
13 CMPO (2012) Does Wage Regulation Harm Kids? Evidence from English Schools
14 CIPD (2012) Reward Management: Annual Survey Report 2012
15 IES (2012) Case Studies on Pay Progression
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•	 The increased use of contribution-based pay and progression, 
measuring staff on a broader combination of achievement of objectives, 
competence, skills and behaviour.
•	 The need for effective appraisal systems and suitably trained line-
managers robustly to underpin new arrangements.
•	 The use of ‘pay zones’ within a wider scale which control progression 
by the means of ‘gates’ or ‘bars’ and which permit progress once a 
competency is acquired, a test is passed or a responsibility is added.
•	 The importance of aligning systems to wider organisational culture.
•	 The importance of simplicity of design and communication in 
successfully transitioning from one system to another.
•	 The need to assess risks relating to the costs of pay progression.
The teachers’ pay system – views of head teachers and governing body chairs
2.23 In autumn 2010 we commissioned research seeking the views and 
experiences of head teachers and chairs of school governing bodies on various 
aspects of the pay system16. This included both their experience of using the 
existing pay provisions and their views on perceived areas of constraint. While 
about two-thirds of respondents were satisfied that the pay system as a whole 
met their needs, a significant proportion sought greater flexibility within a 
national framework. The research found that:
•	 Over 60% of head teachers indicated that there were forms of reward 
or recognition that they would like to use but were unable to, including 
one-off payments. 
•	 The main features of the pay system which provide for local discretion 
were widely used, for example Teaching and Learning Responsibility 
payments (TLRs) (by 81%), Special Education Needs (SEN) allowances 
(40%) and recruitment and retention benefits/incentives (22%). The use 
of the latter was higher in London and the South East than elsewhere, 
and payments were made to teachers with specific responsibilities, 
teachers of specific subjects and to senior teachers. 
•	 Many respondents thought the current provisions could be made more 
flexible. Between a quarter and a third of head teachers said that the 
main allowances were not sufficiently flexible and suggested changes, 
including time-limited payments and greater flexibility on size of award.
•	 There was a significant body of opinion in favour of pay better reflecting 
performance with 52% of head teachers (60% in secondary schools) 
stating that the present system offered insufficient scope to reward high 
performance.
House of Commons Education Committee
2.24 Earlier this year, the House of Commons Education Committee published 
its report on attracting, training and retaining the best teachers17. We noted that 
the report included a number of recommendations relevant to our work:
•	 It commented directly on the importance of pay and recommended a 
pay system which rewards those teachers who add most value to pupil 
performance. The Committee acknowledged the potential difficulties in 
16 Infogroup/ORC International (2011) Teachers’ Pay Issues: research findings 2010
17 House of Commons Education Committee (2012) Great teachers: attracting, training and retaining the best. Ninth 
Report of Session 2010-12 
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introducing such a system, but considered that the comparative impact 
of outstanding teachers was so great that such difficulties must be 
overcome. 
•	 In this context, the Committee also noted the crucial role of governing 
bodies in overseeing performance management in schools, encouraging 
bodies to be rigorous in their scrutiny of the arrangements and in 
properly holding head teachers to account. 
•	 The report also recommended that the Government introduce new, 
formal and flexible career ladders for teachers, with different pathways 
for those who wish to remain as a classroom teacher or teaching 
specialist, linked to pay and conditions and professional development. 
The Committee’s view was that the introduction of such a structure 
would bring significant advantages to the recruitment and retention of 
high-quality teachers, and bring teaching into line with other graduate 
professions in this regard.
•	 The Committee expressed concern that continuous professional 
development for teachers currently lacked coherence and focus, and 
proposed that the Government produce a high-level strategy, including 
proposals for accreditation and an entitlement for all teaching staff.
Evidence from our visits
2.25 Each year, STRB members make several visits to schools and local 
authorities to hear the views and experiences of a range of staff. School visits 
take the form of confidential discussions with small groups of staff, typically 
grouped by career stage (e.g. classroom teachers, middle leaders etc). A list of 
our most recent visits can be found in Appendix E. The following were recurring 
themes relevant to this remit that arose during visits over the last two years:
•	 There was some appetite for more flexible pay and allowances, including 
more flexible TLRs and bonuses. This was strongest among more 
experienced head teachers. Where greater flexibility was opposed, the 
primary concerns related to the additional burden of managing the pay 
system and a risk of subjectivity in awarding discretionary payments.
•	 Schools and local authorities adopted a variety of approaches to address 
recruitment and retention challenges, reward good performance and/or 
temporary additional responsibilities. 
•	 There was a range of views on the operation of the upper pay scale 
(UPS). These included mixed views on perceived automaticity of access, 
a lack of clarity in some areas about the precise purpose of the UPS and 
inconsistency in what was expected of UPS teachers.
•	 There were mixed views on the clarity and consistency of performance 
management, with some calling for greater training for managers.
•	 Performance-related pay was frequently supported in principle but 
felt to be difficult in practice, with particular concerns about ensuring 
consistency. Newer recruits to the profession tended to be more open 
to the principle of performance-related reward and aware of other 
organisations’ practice from their own or their peer groups’ experience.
Themes emerging from the broad evidence base
2.26 Having examined a wide range of evidence on the broad approach to 
teachers’ and others’ pay and career expectations, we have identified some 
consistent themes:
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•	 The status of the teaching profession is key in attracting and retaining 
high quality teachers. This is a characteristic of some of the most 
successful countries. In this context, it is important that levels of pay 
are competitive with other graduate professions. 
•	 The current range of discretionary pay allowances (e.g. for Teaching 
and Learning Responsibilities) is extensively used in schools in England 
and Wales. Levels of use vary by region, suggesting these provisions are 
partly being deployed to address local labour market challenges. 
•	 Whilst most of those who manage the current system of pay for teachers 
are largely satisfied that it meets their needs, many identified areas 
for improvement. These included making it easier to use certain pay 
allowances and improving the scope to reward performance. The latter 
point is also a concern of many commentators and policy makers who 
believe the pay system should do more to reward those who make the 
greatest contributions. 
•	 There are important lessons to be drawn from the experiences of 
other organisations, including on implementing systems that provide 
for pay progression that better reflects an employee’s contribution, 
assessed against both detailed objectives, behaviours and organisational 
contribution. 
The Department’s and consultees’ views and evidence
The Department’s evidence
2.27 The Department’s evidence set out the Secretary of State’s objectives for 
reform:
•	 To develop arrangements for teachers’ pay which reward good 
performance and attract the highest performing graduates and 
professionals into the profession.
•	 To give schools as much freedom as possible to spend their money as 
they see fit to meet their pupils’ needs.
•	 To ensure the best teachers are incentivised to work in the most 
challenging schools.
•	 To provide the best value for money for the tax payer and to ensure 
that the individual decisions of head teachers and governing bodies 
do not result in overall cost inflation in the system and that there are 
arrangements to maintain propriety in these decisions.
2.28 Against this background, the Department’s evidence set out five potential 
models for teacher pay with varying levels of prescription. They ranged from 
complete deregulation, which included the removal of all pay scales and 
allowances (including any distinction between qualified and unqualified 
teachers) to a ‘minimal change’ model which retained the three current pay 
scales (and spine points within them), but anticipated reform of some aspects 
of the pay framework such as performance-related progression and post-
threshold standards. Between these extremes, an alternative provided for three 
pay scales but with deregulation within each. The Department posed some 
fundamental questions in relation to the models, including whether there 
should be minima and maxima and whether any form of geographical pay 
differentiation should be maintained. 
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2.29 To facilitate a common understanding and discussion of the Department’s 
models, we circulated a simplified diagram to all consultees (see Figure 
2.1). Greater detail is available in the Department’s evidence18. We set out in 
Chapters 3 and 4 respectively the Department’s specific evidence on market-
facing pay and on strengthening the link between pay and performance.
Figure 2.1
STRB secretariat diagram of DfE models
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Diagram simplified to aid discussion.  Pay levels shown are national scales, rounded.  
(AST max = £57k; UPS3 = £37k; UPS3 plus max TLR = £49k) 
2.30 In oral evidence the Secretary of State set out how his vision of teachers’ 
pay was linked to his broader policy aims of recruiting and retaining high 
quality professionals and giving head teachers’ maximum autonomy, with 
accountability, for shaping and managing their schools. He believed that the 
current system constrained head teachers and that a more flexible pay system 
would make the profession more attractive. 
2.31 On the questions of speed and scale of reform, he said he wished to 
maximise local autonomy and that, while schools might not exercise all their 
freedoms immediately, this was not a reason for not providing them now. He did 
not want to deny that autonomy to creative and innovative head teachers.
Consultees’ views and evidence
2.32 Consultees’ initial written evidence was submitted in advance of seeing 
the Department’s models and focused chiefly on the issues set out in the remit. 
On market-facing pay (which we examine in the next chapter) teacher unions 
were unanimous in considering that the present framework offered sufficient 
flexibility already for recruitment and retention purposes but believed the 
provisions were underused for a number of reasons. 
2.33 Opinion varied on the matter of pay progression. The teacher unions  
noted the links between pay and performance in the current system, including 
the performance-related progression in the UPS which is widely accepted. Most 
18 DfE (2012) <http://www.education.gov.uk/inthenews/inthenews/a00209099/government-sets-out-case-for-
reforming-teachers-pay>
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argued that there should be no extension of performance-related pay, while 
NAHT, NEOST and NGA said there was a case for strengthening the  
link between pay and performance. We probed these issues in oral evidence 
and set out further details of the evidence from consultees on these matters in 
Chapter 4.
2.34 On other changes to the pay and conditions framework to raise the 
status of the teaching profession, all the teacher unions and NGA considered 
that overall pay levels, comparable to those of other all-graduate professions, 
were important to make teaching a profession of choice. In relation to other 
flexibilities, there was some appetite for greater flexibility (including from 
ASCL, NAHT, NEOST and NGA). Some unions had concerns about the existing 
flexibilities, including that discretions reduced transparency and were based 
on subjective judgements. We set out in Chapter 5 union evidence on specific 
flexibilities in relation to TLRs and recruitment and retention payments.
The Department’s models
2.35 Following sight of the Department’s evidence, some consultees provided 
supplementary submissions and we probed consultees on the issues posed 
by the Department’s models in oral evidence sessions. In discussion, NAHT, 
NEOST, the NGA and the Welsh Government said they saw some advantages in 
greater flexibility but did not support the most deregulated models.
•	 NEOST noted that an approach which retained three pay scales with 
spine points for reference most closely resembled private sector practice 
in national organisations.
•	 NAHT acknowledged that deregulation could present opportunities. It 
said a salary minimum was important and that it was not uncomfortable 
with an approach to reform that retained separate scales (with 
progression points) for unqualified teachers, classroom teachers and 
leadership. 
•	 The Welsh Government noted that some elements of the DfE’s proposals 
would reduce the complexity of the existing system, a principle which 
it supported. It also agreed with enabling faster progression through the 
pay scales for very able teachers.
2.36 Whilst noting some potential advantages, these consultees also said that 
the more radical options on deregulation would pose considerable challenges:
•	 NEOST expressed concerns about the effective management of pay if 
there was increased local determination. It was also concerned that 
some of the proposed models could result in equal pay or other litigation 
challenges. It believed that the proposal for complete deregulation would 
generate too much turbulence.
•	 The Welsh Government questioned whether a link between pay and 
performance was necessary.
•	 NAHT and NGA were also concerned that schools lacked the capacity 
and expertise to manage pay decisions that would be required by the 
most radical models. 
•	 NAHT said that total deregulation was potentially inflationary and risked 
increasing localised industrial disputes. It also believed that reform to 
school funding was a necessary pre-requisite to any significant reform of 
the pay system. 
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2.37 ASCL said that complete deregulation would be damaging, have 
significant practical problems, lead to upward pay drift, result in inconsistent 
approaches to pay, and be very time-consuming for leaders. It believed those 
DfE models which did not distinguish qualified teachers would be detrimental 
to the status of the profession and that some of the models would prevent 
teachers from having a framework to plan their careers. It said that a system 
which retained spine points would allow leaders to better forecast budgets with 
resulting stability.
2.38 ATL believed deregulation would damage the professionalism of teaching 
with negative consequences for recruitment. It rejected the proposed models as 
they incorporated local and performance-related pay. It said the model which 
removed the distinction between unqualified and qualified teachers would 
seriously undermine the standing of the profession. It considered those models 
with greater structure for different career stages were relatively more acceptable. 
ATL supported salary minima for recruitment purposes and believed maxima 
were needed as well.
2.39 NASUWT said there was no evidence to support any of the proposed 
models. It considered ‘no change’ should be an option as it believed the 
current system was not broken and had a number of benefits. It rejected DfE’s 
deregulated models on the following grounds:
•	 They would be inconsistent with wider best practice. Other examples of 
deregulation of pay had failed. 
•	 There was a lack of management capacity or expertise for them.
•	 They would lead to inconsistent practice and inequality.
•	 There was no appetite amongst school leaders for such change 
(including in the independent sector, where 80% of schools based their 
pay structures on STPCD).
•	 They would distract head teachers from focusing on teaching and 
learning.
•	 They would remove the structure for career and pay progression 
arrangements which would affect recruitment, retention and motivation.
•	 They would encourage greater use of unqualified teachers.
2.40 NUT rejected the deregulated models and said that one option for 
consideration must be ‘no change’. It was concerned about the capacity of 
schools to manage a deregulated system and said it would distract heads and 
governing bodies from raising standards. NUT said DfE’s commentary on the 
models had missed several key disadvantages and had misidentified some 
factors as advantages. It believed that minima, maxima and certainty around 
progression were key features of the pay system. 
2.41 UCAC said the current system should be retained and that there was no 
evidence to support complete deregulation. It believed deregulation would be 
time-consuming and lead to disputes. UCAC believed that removing progression 
points would negatively affect morale, and lead to recruitment and retention and 
equal pay issues. 
2.42 Voice had no appetite for any of the deregulated models. It believed that 
managing a deregulated system would be burdensome for schools and risked 
pay becoming artificially inflated or depressed. It said that greater deregulation 
would result in pay becoming less transparent, making career planning more 
difficult. These issues would negatively affect recruitment and mobility.
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STPCD simplification
2.43 The detail of the current pay system is set out in the School Teachers’ Pay 
and Conditions Document (STPCD), a statutory document, including guidance, 
of almost 200 pages, which references a number of other documents. We have 
observed that few people find the STPCD user-friendly and many have pointed 
to a need for significant simplification.
2.44 We specifically sought evidence from consultees on simplification in 
the light of evidence we had already received that the STPCD was complex 
and opaque and that this could hinder effective local decisions on pay. Some 
consultees shared our concern about complexity although others stressed the 
importance of retaining detailed provisions and guidance. We return to the issue 
in Chapter 5.
Themes emerging from consultees’ views
2.45 The key themes arising from consultees’ submissions and oral evidence 
were:
•	 The need for an overarching national pay framework to provide a fair and 
consistent basis for pay decisions and so sustain confidence that the 
teaching profession was valued.
•	 Significant concerns about deregulation along the lines proposed by the 
Secretary of State, particularly the more radical options. Consultees were 
concerned that the evidence base was lacking; about the pace of change 
envisaged; and about the capacity of school leaders and governing 
bodies to manage such change well.
•	 A range of opinion on the extent to which performance is already 
reflected in pay.
•	 Recognition of the desirability of simplification of the STPCD.
•	 The importance of professionalism and a public perception of teaching 
as a high status profession.
Our broad analysis of the issues, and our guiding principles
2.46 International and academic evidence suggests it is of fundamental 
importance that the pay framework supports improved educational outcomes by 
enabling recruitment and retention of high quality teachers across all schools, 
including the most challenging. In doing so, we believe it should both offer 
teachers reward commensurate with their contribution, consistent with most 
other graduate professions; and incentivise performance improvement at all 
stages of teachers’ careers, including by offering a range of possible career 
paths. Such an approach would build on the recommendations of the House of 
Commons Education Committee and, we believe, would resonate with many in 
the profession. 
2.47 The framework must also be operable and meet the needs of those 
accountable for school performance. Many school leaders seek improvements 
to the current system they have to manage, and want flexibility better to meet 
local needs and to reward performance. We believe the pay framework should 
be simple and transparent so head teachers can use it with confidence to meet 
local needs and teachers are confident that decisions based on it are robust and 
defensible. Greater autonomy at local level would be consistent with the wish 
of successive Secretaries of State to give school leaders more freedom, allied to 
accountability, to determine how best to secure improved outcomes. 
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2.48 We have rooted our analysis in the evidence base with the intention of 
identifying some guiding principles (set out below) which can command wide 
support, from policy makers and the profession, and be sustainable over time, 
as this report charts a path towards longer-term reform. We believe much of our 
analysis, and the retention of a broad national framework, will be supported 
by statutory consultees, whose contribution to this remit has helped shape our 
deliberations and reflected the concerns of many in the profession. Inevitably, 
however, there will be some important differences of emphasis and approach, 
including in relation to detailed design of the framework and the pace of 
change. We return in Chapter 6 to the need to stage reform and comment on 
the importance of capacity building, including the role of governing bodies and 
school leadership teams as enablers of change.
2.49 We recognise that professionals’ career expectations extend well beyond 
a modern, competitive pay and conditions framework. They include challenging 
work and substantial autonomy, early responsibility and the possibility of rapid 
progression on a career path. Professionals expect to work with high calibre 
colleagues and to manage their own careers, with opportunities for structured 
professional development and regular high quality appraisal. We comment 
further on performance appraisal and the importance of a strong focus on 
professional development in Chapter 6. 
Our guiding principles
2.50 To ensure our proposals are consistent with our ambitions for the pay 
framework, as set out above, we developed the following guiding principles on 
what a pay framework should offer: 
•	 reward excellence in the teaching profession and so support improved 
educational outcomes for pupils;
•	 offer appropriate reward, allied to accountability, for good classroom 
teachers at all stages in their careers; 
•	 ensure progression reflects improvements in performance and 
contribution to the school;
•	 raise the professional status of teachers, including by appropriate reward 
and support for professional development;
•	 provide greater autonomy for head teachers and governing bodies to 
match resources to the particular needs of their schools;
•	 simplify the existing pay system so head teachers and governing bodies 
can use it with confidence to make robust and defensible decisions. 
2.51 In subsequent chapters, we examine in detail the three remit items, 
drawing on relevant parts of the evidence base and keeping these guiding 
principles in mind. In developing our recommendations for changes to the 
national pay framework, we have also had regard to the particular considerations 
annexed to the remit letter and make some observations as necessary on issues 
including school funding and responsibilities in relation to equal pay. 
2.52 In the course of the remit, we have reviewed the main elements of 
the classroom teacher pay framework and we propose a substantial package 
of reform. It will give schools greater flexibility to recruit, reward and retain 
teachers in the context of their specific circumstances; reform progression 
arrangements to secure a better link with performance; and remove prescription 
and bureaucracy in the framework, making it easier for schools to meet local 
needs and offer able teachers a choice of career paths. 
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CHAPTER 3
Market-facing pay for local areas
Introduction
3.1 The Secretary of State asked us to consider for recommendation:
how the pay framework for teachers could best be made more market-
facing in local areas.
3.2 In this chapter we summarise the evidence provided to us on this issue, 
and present our analysis of this and of other relevant data and considerations. 
We then set out our conclusions, including the links between this part of 
the remit and the other issues which the Secretary of State has asked us to 
consider.
3.3 The current pay system for England and Wales includes four geographic 
pay bands (Inner London, Outer London, the London Fringe and the rest of 
England and Wales). These provide for differential levels of pay at all stages 
of a teacher’s career with, for example, starting salaries in Inner London 25% 
higher than nationally and more modest enhancements in Outer London and 
the Fringe. Current minima and maxima for classroom teachers are set out in 
Appendix G. In addition schools have discretion locally to award recruitment 
and retention allowances.
The wider debate and evidence base on market-facing pay 
3.4 The Government set out its high-level thinking on market-facing pay well 
ahead of our receiving a formal remit from the Secretary of State for Education 
and published its generic evidence on the case for more market-facing pay in 
March 2012. Several review bodies received such remits and on their behalf the 
Office of Manpower Economics (OME):
•	 issued a call for evidence1 for any organisation or interested party to 
submit evidence relevant to these remits;
•	 commissioned independent research from IDS on wider approaches 
to geographical pay differentiation, to provide an up-to-date review of 
practice among private sector employers. 
3.5 We summarise briefly below the generic evidence we received from the 
Government and others and provide a fuller account in Appendix F. As we 
explain, some of the generic evidence is of limited relevance to the teaching 
profession as it covers both graduate and non-graduate professions. For the 
remainder of this chapter we focus on the issues most relevant to a graduate 
professional workforce. This includes detailed evidence from the Department 
and our own consultees, submitted in the light of our wider-ranging remit from 
the Secretary of State on reform of the teacher pay system; and our examination 
of the teacher labour market.
1 See call to evidence letter at Appendix C. Responses to OME’s call for wider evidence referred to in this Appendix 
can be found on the OME website (www.ome.uk.com).
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Generic evidence on public-private sector pay differentials and geographical pay 
differentiation2
3.6 The Government and several consultees referred in their evidence to 
recent studies of public-private sector pay differentials. Work by the Office 
of National Statistics (ONS) and the Institute of Fiscal Studies (IFS), which 
controlled for observed differences in workforce characteristics, estimated 
differentials of around 8% in favour of the public sector across all occupations. 
While these estimates provide an economy-wide measure of relative earnings, 
they are not representative of specific occupations. Teaching is a graduate 
profession and in this context both IFS and ONS noted important differences 
in the magnitude of public-private pay differentials across the earnings 
distribution. IFS found that the pay differential for the top 10% of earners was 
around zero while ONS reported that graduates in the public sector earned less 
on average than their counterparts in the private sector.
3.7 The Government argued that in places where private sector firms had to 
compete for workers with public sector employers offering a pay premium, the 
introduction of more local, market-facing pay could help private businesses 
become more competitive. OME’s wider call for evidence sought examples of 
where private sector employers have had difficulty in recruiting or retaining staff 
because of competition from employers of Pay Review Body remit groups. OME 
received limited evidence on this and none on ‘crowding out’ associated with 
the teaching profession.
3.8 Research commissioned by OME into private sector practice in 
geographical pay differentiation3 found that organisations typically used a 
small number of geographical zones for differentiating pay and these were most 
commonly related to London and its environs. The research also found that 
local pay tended to be set centrally; that geographical differences were highest 
for the most junior staff and that the recent trend, due to diminishing labour 
market pressures, was away from locational pay differentiation.
Views and evidence from the Department and consultees 
3.9 The Department argued in its written evidence that the current pay 
system did not support schools in recruiting and retaining high quality teachers, 
and that pay reform was critical to raising educational standards, given the 
evidence on the importance of high quality teaching. As we noted in Chapter 2 
it set out five potential models (with variants) for reform of the pay structure. 
3.10 The models incorporated two distinct (though not mutually exclusive) 
options for addressing local market-facing challenges. The first would involve 
greater autonomy for individual schools resulting from deregulation of the 
pay system, providing for flexible pay which was locally adaptable and able 
to take account of a range of factors impacting on recruitment and retention. 
These might include the degree of challenge facing a school and shortages of 
particular subject teachers, as well as conditions in the local labour market. 
The second option would incorporate a centrally determined structure of 
local or regional pay where pay levels for geographical areas were prescribed 
but potentially offering greater differentiation than at present through use of 
2 A fuller summary of the generic evidence is provided in Appendix F   
3 IDS (2012) Case studies on Geographically-Differentiated Pay
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additional pay bands/zones. It would rely on the identification of appropriate 
criteria to define the bands/zones and pay levels would then apply to all 
teachers in the geographical location. 
3.11 In oral evidence, the Secretary of State was clear that he sought 
maximum deregulation of the pay system but acknowledged this might not 
be accomplished immediately. He placed particular emphasis on the need to 
incentivise talented teachers to work in challenging schools in lower pay areas. 
He also stressed he was keen to avoid anomalies, for example through the 
creation of more ‘cliff-edges’4.
3.12 In support of a more flexible approach, the Department said the current 
pay system did not allow for local circumstances, either those of the school or 
the local labour market, to influence rates of pay. It referred to HMT’s generic 
evidence which suggested that the public sector sometimes pays more than is 
necessary to recruit, retain and motivate staff in some areas. It also noted that 
a competitive salary against other graduate professions was critical to ensuring 
teaching could attract and retain high quality graduates, including to schools in 
challenging circumstances.
3.13 In relation to the teacher labour market it said that the current system of 
national pay scales and four pay bands had resulted in the under and oversupply 
of teachers. This varied across (and within) regions with, for example, vacancies 
being higher in areas where pay was low relative to the private sector or where 
the cost of living (house prices) was high. The Department believed these 
issues could be addressed by a more flexible, local-facing pay structure. It set 
out a number of analyses to support its arguments for local market-facing pay. 
These included data which demonstrated the variation in teacher vacancies, 
differences in the regional cost of living, and in teachers’ earnings relative to 
private sector professions.
3.14 In its written evidence, the Welsh Government supported the retention 
of a national framework. It said that this was a better, fairer and more cost-
effective way of setting pay. The Welsh Government rejected market-facing pay 
on the following grounds:
•	 it would adversely impact on the low paid and women;
•	 it would create recruitment and retention problems, particularly for 
schools in deprived and rural areas;
•	 it was not supported by the profession and the private sector did not 
operate such systems.
3.15 The Welsh Government questioned HMT’s analyses of public sector pay 
premia in Wales, noting that the reported estimates were uncertain due to small 
sample sizes and did not account for several important factors. The Welsh 
Government said HMT’s submission had provided no evidence demonstrating 
that public sector salaries were crowding out the private sector.
3.16 NEOST said it supported the retention of a national framework and 
considered the current pay bands to be broadly correct. It believed sufficient 
flexibilities existed to manage recruitment problems (e.g. maths and science 
4 ‘Cliff edge’ refers here to the pay differentials (and their possible impact on recruitment and retention) that occur 
either side of pay band boundaries, for example the boundary between Inner London and Outer London.
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teachers, leadership group in small primaries) but that they could be simplified 
to further their use. It noted that equal pay issues and the impact on local 
economies would need consideration if local pay was introduced, and that any 
changes would need to be accompanied by a review of the funding formula for 
schools.
3.17 The teacher unions unanimously rejected the introduction of local pay 
and supported the retention of a national pay and conditions framework. 
They noted that other national employers used national frameworks with little 
variation outside London and the South East. NUT and ATL viewed the existing 
pay bands as addressing ‘cost compensation’ and noted the importance of 
stability in the pay bands. 
3.18 All of the unions said the existing framework, with its four pay bands and 
further discretionary provisions, was adequate for recruitment and retention 
purposes but that the available flexibilities were underused. A number of 
reasons were suggested to explain this:
•	 funding constraints;
•	 cultural reasons including in relation to equity and collegiality;
•	 the rigidities of the provisions as set out in the STPCD;
•	 a lack of awareness of the provisions;
•	 a lack of confidence in applying the provisions;
•	 local authorities discouraging their use.
3.19 To encourage greater use of existing provisions, NASUWT said that 
clarification of the STPCD (without removing guidance) and the inclusion of 
examples would help. ATL believed school leaders required more support and 
better guidance to use existing flexibilities. UCAC said governors needed more 
training on recruitment and retention payments and believed that knowledge 
of the STPCD should be included in the NPQH qualification for aspiring head 
teachers.
3.20 The unions also commented on the Government’s evidence on public 
and private sector pay differentials and pointed to its failure to acknowledge a 
number of methodological criticisms relating to the figures cited. They noted 
a lack of evidence on public sector salaries ‘crowding out’ the private sector. 
Several questioned the credibility of the Department’s analyses of local pay 
and said that it had not properly recognised existing pay allowances and the 
four pay band system. Some unions also argued that the economic crisis had 
masked long-term recruitment and retention problems which were attributable 
to teachers’ pay falling relative to other professions.
3.21 The unions saw a number of risks with local pay. These included 
increasing recruitment and retention problems (including in deprived areas), 
reducing teacher mobility, increasing equal pay issues and widening the gender 
pay gap in teaching. Several believed that local pay would result in upward pay 
drift to prevent teachers from being poached by other schools. 
3.22 Several unions said that managing local pay would detract from the 
core task of teaching and learning. UCAC considered local pay would have 
devastating consequences for the Welsh economy. NAHT made the point that a 
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more complex centralised system of local or regional pay was incompatible with 
increased deregulation.
3.23 NASUWT submitted research on local pay5 which concluded that there 
were good reasons for retaining the current four band structure and little 
evidence to support further pay differentiation. Six unions6 had also jointly 
commissioned two pieces of research. The first7 questioned the evidence for 
greater variation in public sector pay. The second8 suggested that local pay 
would impact negatively on teacher mobility.
3.24 The NGA and Governors Wales supported the retention of a national 
pay framework and rejected local pay on the basis that it would create further 
recruitment problems, including more ‘cliff-edge’ issues. NGA rejected the 
Department’s argument that the private sector operated local pay scales and 
believed centrally determined pay bands or hotspots would be inconsistent 
with the Government’s desire for greater devolution in schools. It said teacher 
supply issues were not always linked to location and cited difficulties recruiting 
shortage subject teachers and head teachers in small, rural and Catholic 
schools. Governors Wales said local pay would create disharmony and be costly 
to implement.
Our analysis
3.25 We set out in Chapter 2 our guiding principles for pay reform. Of 
particular relevance are the principles of providing greater autonomy for 
schools to match resources to the particular needs of their schools; and of 
simplifying the pay system so head teachers and governing bodies can use it 
with confidence. We have commented repeatedly on geographical pay issues 
in past reports and have made a series of recommendations for reform, in 
response to specific recruitment and retention challenges, the last of which 
were implemented in 2008. Our recommendations included a number of 
differentially higher pay awards for London. As a result, there is a now a marked 
difference in the levels of basic pay at different stages of a teacher’s career 
with starting salaries in Inner London 25% higher than nationally. This variation 
continues, albeit at more modest levels, as teachers progress through the 
system (15% at M6 and 22% at U3). 
3.26 The four geographical bands are supplemented by other flexibilities for 
local use, notably discretion to pay more for recruitment and retention purposes 
and the ability to start above the minimum of the pay scale. However, we 
heard from many consultees that head teachers and governing bodies are often 
reluctant to make full use of these flexibilities. We return to this in Chapter 5.
The pay premia comparisons
3.27 There has been considerable debate among commentators and our 
consultees on the validity and limitations of analyses of pay premia. We note 
that great care is needed in their interpretation. In particular:
5 IDS (2012) Regional or local pay and its implications for the teaching profession
6 ASCL, ATL, NAHT, NUT, UCAC and Voice
7 IDS (2012) Regional variations in pay for UK graduates and graduate comparator occupations – the regional pay 
debate
8 LRD (2012) Teachers’ mobility and local pay
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•	 They are subject to cyclical variation. It is important to consider the time 
period of the analyses in relation to the economic cycle. In addition, 
there is evidence of significant movement in the differentials over the 
longer term. 
•	 Most data sources do not reflect all elements of remuneration (e.g. 
bonuses, pensions and other benefits). We were not presented with 
evidence that attempted to make comparisons on a Total Reward basis 
and note that any such comparisons require robust data and can be 
methodologically complex9. 
•	 The level of premia varies considerably across the earnings distribution. 
Any differentials found at lower levels of the earnings distribution may 
not apply at more senior levels.
•	 The relevance of comparisons across all occupational groups is of very 
limited value in examining the appropriateness of pay levels of particular 
public sector professions, including teachers.
3.28 Recognising these caveats, there seems to be some consistency between 
the sources in suggesting that there is an overall positive pay differential across 
all occupations between the public and private sectors in the UK, especially 
for women. This gap has widened recently; it varies geographically; it is much 
greater for those at the lower end of the pay distribution but close to zero at 
the top end. As we noted earlier, much of the analysis presented covers all 
occupations, so tells us little about the relative position of teachers’ pay.
3.29 Teachers are clearly part of the graduate labour market and we note 
that the analyses of both IFS and ONS suggest that at the top end of the 
earnings distribution the pay premia is removed – or reversed. Key questions for 
consideration in relation to the teacher workforce are:
•	 How does pay compare with that of other professionals, including 
whether any significant differentials are geographically widespread or 
localised? We consider this in paragraphs 3.30 - 3.36 below.
•	 To what extent do the flexibilities in the teacher pay system enable 
employing bodies to be responsive where differentials lead to problems 
of recruitment and retention? We consider this from paragraph 3.48 
onwards.
Teachers’ earnings compared to other professional occupations
3.30 Our own analysis of median earnings estimates10 suggests that teachers’ 
earnings are broadly similar to those of other professional occupations in 
some regions but lag in others (see paragraph 3.35 below for more detail). 
Our analysis of detailed earnings data also suggests some variation within 
regions11. One important influence is that the composition of the private sector 
comparators can vary significantly between local labour markets.
9 We noted but did not examine in detail for this remit a study which compared Total Reward at more senior levels 
in the public and private sectors, over a career lifetime: Labour Economics 19(4): 584-94 (August 2012) Total 
Reward and Pensions in the UK in the Public and Private Sectors (Alexander Danzer and Peter Dolton).
10 OME analysis of ONS ASHE and DfE School Workforce Census data. Data for other professional occupations from 
ASHE are sample-based so estimates are associated with a margin of error.
11 Sub-regional analyses of the non-teaching workforce require considerable caution due to small sample sizes and 
consequently larger margins of error.
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3.31 We have undertaken a range of analyses of teachers’ earnings, comparing 
both the starting pay and the profession-wide earnings with those of other 
professions. Teaching is a professional occupation which should aim to 
attract the highest performing graduates, in line with the objectives set out 
in the Secretary of State’s evidence. As such we believe it right to compare 
teachers’ earnings with those of other professional occupations as described 
by the Standard Occupational Classification. Other analyses using different 
definitions for comparator groups are possible. While we were able to draw on 
comprehensive data on teachers’ earnings, data relating to other professions 
are drawn from sample-based surveys, so all earnings figures for these groups 
should be treated as estimates with some margin of error.
3.32 Our analysis12 suggests that in 2011 teachers’ starting pay was broadly 
equal to that for other professional occupations in a number of regions 
(North West, East Midlands and Yorkshire and Humberside). In other regions, 
accounting for over half of all teachers, the estimated median starting pay of 
other professional occupations exceeded that of teachers. Regions where the 
gap was greatest were the South East, North East, East and South West (see 
Figure 3.1 below). Our analysis of 2010 data showed similar results.
Figure 3.1 
Teachers’ starting salaries compared to 2011 graduates entering other 
professional occupations
3.33 There is considerable variation in starting salaries around the median for 
other professional occupations; for example, the middle 50% of starting salaries 
(the inter-quartile range) typically spanned a range of some £8,000-£9,000 
around the headline median value (see Figure 3.2 below)13.
12 OME analysis of HESA Destination of Leavers from Higher Education (DLHE) survey data (2010/11). Data are 
sample-based so estimates are associated with a margin of error.
13 OME analysis of HESA Destination of Leavers from Higher Education (DLHE) survey data (2010/11). Data are 

























Starting salaries of 2011 graduates entering other professional occupations 
(median and inter-quartile ranges) 
3.34 We note that in Inner London starting pay for teachers is broadly 
competitive at the current time. This follows previous differential increases to 
Inner London starting pay to address its particular recruitment and retention 
challenges. However, our analysis of detailed data (from HESA and AGR14) 
suggests that some of the sectors that target high calibre graduates do pay 
significantly higher starting salaries, both in London and elsewhere. These 
include branches of engineering and medical professions (with median starting 
salaries ranging from £25,000 to £30,000)15, as well as those sectors which 
offer the highest starting salaries (with medians in excess of £37,000) such as 
investment banking and law16. It will be important to ensure that starting pay 
remains competitive with most graduate professions (recognising that there will 
be some that pay significantly higher) to attract good quality graduates. We will 
need to monitor this carefully if improvements in the economy lead to increases 
in starting pay elsewhere, impacting on the quality of teacher recruits.
3.35 Our wider analysis of median earnings for classroom teachers17 in 
2010/11 suggests they are broadly similar to other professional occupations 
in a number of regions (North East, South West, North West, Yorkshire and 
Humberside, West Midlands). In London, South East, East of England and East 
Midlands, which account for around half of all classroom teachers, estimated 
median earnings are lagging other professional occupations (see Figure 3.3 
below).
14 AGR (2012) The AGR Graduate Recruitment Survey, Winter Review
15 OME analysis of HESA Destination of Leavers from Higher Education (DLHE) survey data (2010/11). Data are 
sample-based so estimates are associated with a margin of error
16 OME analysis of AGR/High Fliers reports; High Fliers Research (2012), The graduate market in 2012
17 OME analysis of ONS ASHE and DfE School Workforce Census data. Our analysis focuses on the comparison 
between full-time classroom teachers (including ASTs and Excellent Teachers) and other professional occupations. 

























Teachers’ median earnings compared to those of other professional occupations, 
2010/11
3.36 Our data analysis extended to exploration of within-region earnings 
comparisons with other professionals. Sample size limitations make meaningful 
comparisons difficult, especially at very local levels (such as travel to work 
areas). However we did examine estimates of the earnings of teachers and 
other professional occupations in predominantly urban and rural areas within 
regions. We found that while teachers’ median earnings were relatively flat 
across regions, the estimated median earnings of other professional occupations 
tended to be higher in urban than in rural areas in several regions. As a 
result we observed that teachers’ earnings were more likely to trail those of 
other professionals in urban areas. This pattern was somewhat reversed in 
predominantly rural areas in some regions, with teachers’ pay tending to be 
higher (see Figure 3.4 below). While still requiring a degree of caution because 
of sample sizes, these findings provide some evidence of the localised nature 
of the labour markets in which schools compete for teachers. The finding that 
teachers’ median earnings tend to trail those of other professionals in urban 
areas reinforces the need to monitor competitive pay levels carefully, especially 
as economic conditions change and recruitment and retention in these areas 































Ratio of classroom teachers’ median earnings to those of other professional 
occupations, by region and urban/rural location18 19
The evidence on wider impact/crowding out
3.37 On the specific issue of the impact of public-private sector pay 
differentials on local economies there appears to be little hard evidence 
available. Wages that are too high in relation to the private sector could clearly 
have the potential to hurt private sector businesses, but we have not been 
presented with any substantive evidence that crowding out by the teaching 
profession is in fact causing any specific problems.
3.38 On the impact of local pay differentials on educational standards, we 
noted in Chapter 2 recently published research by Britton and Propper which 
suggested a relationship between value added by secondary schools and the 
level of average wages in the local labour market20. While the authors attribute 
this to the regulation of teachers’ pay, the complex range of influences on 
school performance suggests some caution is needed in interpreting such 
studies. As we note below, recruitment and retention can vary markedly within 
local areas, and persistent problems may be at the level of individual schools or 
subjects. This suggests highly targeted approaches to tackling problems need to 
be part of the pay framework to support school improvement.
18 Local authorities are defined as ‘Predominantly Urban’ where at least 74% of the population live in urban areas, 
and ‘Predominantly Rural’ where at least 50% of the population live in rural settlements and large market towns. 
All London local authorities were classified as ‘Predominantly Urban’.
19 OME analysis of ONS ASHE and DfE School Workforce Census data for full-time employees. All estimates for other 
professional occupations are associated with a margin of error, but where sample sizes are small the margins of 
error will be wider as a consequence. Similar patterns in the earnings of ‘other professionals occupations’ were 
observed in repeating the analysis with 2010 ASHE data.


























The evidence on wider practice
3.39 The research on wider practice indicated that where the private sector 
used pay differentiation it typically used a small number of geographical bands, 
including a national scale and specific rates for London and the South East. 
We also note from those organisations included in the research that the recent 
trend was towards simpler geographical pay differentiation reflecting current 
labour market circumstances. Private sector organisations operating nationally 
generally favoured central control over local pay differentiation because this 
provided simplicity, avoided duplication and enabled employers to control costs. 
3.40 The current framework for teachers’ pay, with four geographically defined 
pay bands and provisions for discretionary payments to support recruitment and 
retention, broadly resembles this wider practice.
Patterns of recruitment and retention
3.41 In paragraphs 3.30 to 3.36 above we set out the evidence on how 
teachers’ pay compares with other professionals on a regional and sub-regional 
basis. Before setting out our conclusions, we also considered up-to-date 
evidence on the teacher labour market overall and the local dimension to 
recruitment and retention problems.
3.42 Recruitment and retention, as measured by official vacancy figures, 
appears healthy. Headline vacancy rates21 in England fell from 0.8% in 2000 
to 0.4% in 2010. Using a new collection methodology, the latest reported rate 
(for November 2011) is 0.1%. Within the headline figures, the previously high 
vacancy rates in London have fallen significantly and there have also been 
reductions in the rates for ‘shortage’ secondary subjects. While the economic 
cycle will have benefited recruitment to the profession, we believe the bolstering 
of the London pay scales in recent years will also have played an important role. 
The headline vacancy rate in Wales has been stable over recent years and was 
0.4% in 201222.
3.43 We welcome the improved vacancy figures but believe they should be 
treated with caution. We are aware of the change in collection methodology 
which has contributed to some of the reported decrease in England and the 
fact that the statistics cover advertised vacancies and mask schools’ coping 
strategies, such as the use of non-specialist subject teachers and recruitment 
of some teachers on temporary contracts because of the difficulty making an 
appropriate permanent appointment. We are also mindful that the recruitment 
climate could become more challenging as the economic cycle evolves, and 
demand for teachers increases in line with forecast increases in pupil numbers.
3.44 As we have noted in past reports, persistent recruitment and retention 
problems tend to be very localised, and are therefore masked by the aggregate-
level vacancy figures. These more localised challenges are focused on individual 
schools or groups of schools, and can be clustered in pockets within a broader 
area. They may arise for a variety of reasons, such as competition from 
alternative employers or the socio-economic character of the immediate area, 
and resultant challenge. 
21 OME analysis of DfE vacancy statistics. Vacancies defined as: Advertised vacancies for full-time permanent 
appointments (or appointments of at least one term’s duration). Includes  vacancies being filled on a temporary 
basis of less than one term.
22 Welsh Government (2012) Teachers in Service, Vacancies and Sickness Absence, January 2012
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3.45 Our analysis of the distributional patterns of deprivation23 highlighted the 
fact that even within a single local authority area, a wide range of contextual 
circumstances can co-exist with small areas of high deprivation frequently 
located alongside areas of significantly lower challenge. This is illustrated in 
the map of Leeds below, which contains small areas which range across the 
spectrum of deprivation, including several among both the 10% most and the 
10% least deprived in England24.
Figure 3.5 Index of Multiple Deprivation (IMD) 2010, Leeds
3.46 Recruitment and retention problems are often related to specific subject 
shortages. Although conventional wisdom suggests these are most likely to occur 
in high-cost areas, this is not always the case. For example, the maps below 
highlight above average concentrations of commercially advertised vacancies for 
teachers of maths and physics25, suggesting possible shortages in these subjects 
across a range of areas (shaded red). We have also heard anecdotal evidence on 
our visits, and from the teacher unions, of localised problems relating to schools 
on the edges of the existing pay bands.
23 The Index of Multiple Deprivation 2010 combines a number of indicators, chosen to cover a range of economic, 
social and housing issues, into a single deprivation score for each small area in England. This allows each area to 
be ranked relative to one another according to their level of deprivation.
24 DCLG (2010) Indices of deprivation.
25 EDS Vactrack database under license to the Teaching Agency. Data cover the period 2005/06-2010/11. The stress 
maps are derived from a combination of commercially advertised teacher vacancy information and the distribution 
of (secondary) teachers. A region is defined as being under stress when the proportion of advertised vacancies for 
main scale classroom teachers in that region, say in Maths, is substantially greater than the proportion of in-service 
teachers within the region (areas marked in red on the map).
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Figure 3.6 Maths and Physics vacancies
Maths Physics
 
3.47 These problems cannot be addressed through a structure of centrally 
determined pay zones. Rather, they require targeted responses, tailored to the 
needs of individual schools such that they are able to deploy pay provisions as 
flexibly as possible to address recruitment and retention problems as they arise.
Patterns in the use of existing flexibilities
3.48 Many consultees have referred to the existing provisions for discretionary 
pay in the STPCD. Our analysis of earnings extended to an examination of the 
use of the key payments outside of basic pay that are available to classroom 
teachers. 
3.49 Using DfE’s School Workforce Census data, we found that some 27% of 
primary and 56% of secondary full-time classroom teachers26 received some 
form of payment in addition to their basic pay in 2010/11. Within these figures, 
21% of primary teachers and 44% of secondary teachers received TLRs. Other 
allowances received were SEN, recruitment and retention payments and ‘other’ 
(unspecified in the data) payments.
3.50 The proportion of teachers in receipt of additional payments varied 
by region: for primary schools from 21% (North East and Yorkshire and 
Humberside) to 41% (Inner London); for secondary schools from 49% 
(Yorkshire and Humberside) to 62% (Inner London). Within these figures we 
noted higher than average use of TLRs in London – despite these payments 
not being designed as a recruitment and retention tool. Use of designated 
recruitment and retention payments also varied across regions but was notably 
heavier in Inner London than elsewhere.
26 Teachers on the main or upper pay scale.
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3.51 We also note from our wider research the appetite from some for the 
existing allowances to be deployed with greater flexibility. We further note that 
several of our consultees have commented on the perceived under-use of these 
provisions.
Our conclusions
3.52 We have carefully examined the wider generic evidence on market-
facing pay. We note the data presented on public-private pay differentials and 
in particular that where there are significant differentials, these are shown 
to be towards the lower end of the income distribution and that the gap is 
removed at the higher end. Indeed, the ONS analysis suggested that the 
average earnings of graduates in the public sector were lower than those of their 
counterparts in the private sector. This is key in the context of teaching which is 
a graduate profession, and is supported by our own comparative analysis which 
demonstrated that teachers’ median earnings lagged those of other professional 
occupations in several regions. We saw no evidence of crowding out of the 
private sector by the teaching profession. 
3.53 We have noted the evidence of wider geographical pay practice which 
tends to focus any differentials on London and the South East. The existing 
pay system for teachers, with its four pay bands, broadly resembles this wider 
practice. Given the marked differences in base pay between Inner London and 
national bands (with graduated differences in Outer London and the Fringe) 
and the potential for local discretion on recruitment and retention allowances, 
we consider that the Department’s evidence underplays the extent to which the 
teachers’ pay framework allows for local circumstances to be accounted for. 
3.54 However, there is evidence that the available provisions to address 
market-facing challenges are not always used to their full potential, partly 
because of a cultural reluctance and partly because the complexity of the 
pay document militates against understanding. There is also some appetite 
for making some of the current discretions less rigid, which may ease 
understanding and further encourage their use (we return to this in Chapter 5). 
3.55 Against the background of evidence on wider practice and the 
Department’s invitation to consider the issues, we looked critically at the 
proposition that additional zones or hotspots would help in relation to the 
teaching workforce. Our view is that this would risk introducing significant 
complexities:
•	 Basing a system on the type of detailed data presented in the 
Department’s evidence could lead to the development of a very large 
number of local zones/bands.
•	 This would create additional ‘cliff-edge’ issues, with the associated 
impact on recruitment and teacher mobility.
•	 There are significant data challenges in defining the zones, including the 
need to consider how they would be updated on a timely basis as local 
economies changed.
•	 There would undoubtedly be increased bureaucracy and cost in 
managing a more complex system.
•	 A zonal system would have inherent inefficiencies as zones would not be 
optimal in targeting very localised recruitment and retention issues.
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3.56 We consider the potential problems outweigh any potential benefits. 
Although STRB has in the past outlined a possible model for ’hotspots’ (in 
the form of schools making the case to be put in a higher pay band27) the 
environment has since changed significantly. Our predecessors envisaged 
a role for local authorities in assessing business cases, which would not 
be appropriate in the context of much greater autonomy for schools. Our 
wider recommendations in this report on pay flexibility at school level offer a 
potentially more efficient and targeted way of tackling local recruitment and 
retention problems, with less bureaucracy.
3.57 In the medium term there may be a case for review of the existing 
geographic pay bands although we note that other organisations seek relative 
stability in their framework of local pay to avoid triggering unnecessary change. 
However, we would welcome a future remit if analysis of teachers’ pay, or 
recruitment and retention evidence, suggests significant overall imbalances in 
the differentials they offer; or if progress in using broader pay flexibilities in 
schools suggests some or all of the bands are becoming redundant. 
3.58 In summary, our view, reinforced by our analysis, is that the real need 
is for the pay system to have the flexibility to target school-level recruitment 
and retention problems, recognising that schools within the same area can 
often be working in very different circumstances and require the flexibility to 
react accordingly. The Secretary of State emphasised the importance of using 
the pay system flexibly to incentivise the most able teachers to work in the 
most challenging schools. In our view, these situations cannot be addressed 
effectively through the further refinement of a centrally determined structure of 
geographic pay bands or zones. 
Recommendations
3.59 Our recommendations are part of a wider package set out later in this 
report to increase flexibility in the pay framework and so give schools freedom to 
make local decisions. On the specific issue of geographical differentiation, we 
recommend:
•	 the retention, for now, of the four geographic pay bands as the starting 
point for recognising broad labour market differences which bear widely 
on recruitment and retention.
3.60 This, combined with other current provisions, means the pay system 
offers schools a range of mechanisms which assist in the recruitment and 
retention of teachers:
•	 The four pay bands, which address broad geographic labour market 
differences.
•	 Recruitment and retention payments and incentives to address local 
problems.
•	 The freedom to appoint staff above the designated minimum, taking 
account of experience.
3.61 Our wider recommendations in Chapters 4 and 5 will offer the following 
additional support to schools in recruiting and retaining teachers whilst making 
most effective use of their resource:
27 STRB (2004) Thirteenth Report – Part 2, TSO (Cm 6146)
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•	 The freedom to offer more rapid progression to the most able teachers.
•	 The flexibility to award time-limited responsibility allowances.
•	 Increased flexibility in the use of recruitment and retention payments 
and incentives.
•	 The option to design higher paid posts which reward some of the very 
best teachers for leading the improvement of teaching skills.
3.62 We consider that, taken together, these changes will enable schools to 
respond more effectively to local market conditions, including by attracting 
high quality graduates overall; by targeting pay to recruit and retain teachers of 
shortage subjects; and by providing incentives for those with the skills needed 
to work in the most challenging schools.
3.63 We will continue to monitor recruitment and retention overall to assess 
how far the combination of these flexibilities for schools and the geographic pay 
bands remain effective in addressing the specific issues associated with London 
and its fringe areas, including difficulties with retention of experienced teachers 
when family and financial obligations may make London less attractive.
3.64 Finally, we note the importance of funding reform to enable all schools 
to make effective use of local pay flexibilities. Funding issues go well beyond 
our remit, but given their importance in relation to pay we make the following 
observation. To secure the full benefits of greater autonomy and discretion, 
it will be important that funding for individual schools appropriately reflects 
their different conditions, including the particular challenges which impact on 
teacher recruitment and retention. We therefore attach particular importance to 
the Government’s intention to implement in the next spending review period a 
National Funding Formula to ensure similar schools and pupils, wherever they 
are, attract similar levels of funding.
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CHAPTER 4
Linking pay to performance
Background to the remit
4.1 The Secretary of State asked us to consider for recommendation:
how the pay scales, including the main and upper pay scales, should 
be reformed to more effectively link pay and performance, including 
arrangements for progression.
Current pay arrangements for classroom teachers
4.2 Classroom teachers are paid on one of three pay scales (unqualified 
teachers, main and upper pay scales) or on the Advanced Skills Teacher (AST) 
pay spine or the Excellent Teacher (ET) pay range. As noted in Chapter 3, all 
pay is organised into four geographic pay bands. Current rates are shown at 
Appendix G.
Main scale
4.3 Qualified classroom teachers on the main scale (MPS) progress through 
a six point incremental scale unless they have been notified that their 
performance is not satisfactory1. All teachers are required to have an annual 
performance appraisal where:
•	 the teacher’s performance is assessed against standards2 and objectives; 
and
•	 the teacher’s professional development needs are assessed and action 
identified to address them.
4.4 In practice, almost all teachers below the maximum of the MPS (M6) 
progress annually. The value of each increment is 8% of pay3. Schools can 
award additional points for excellent performance but rarely do so in practice.
Upper pay scale
4.5 Teachers must make an application and demonstrate to their head teacher 
that they meet a separate set of standards4 to pass the threshold to the upper 
pay scale (UPS), a three-point incremental scale. The value of each of these 
increments is 4%5. Progression to the next point on the upper pay scale is only 
possible after two years, other than in exceptional circumstances, based on 
appraisal including against the post-threshold standards6.
1 DfE (2012) School Teachers’ Pay and Conditions Document 2012, paragraph 18.1.1(b)
2 Ibid. Annex 2
3 This figure applies to the England and Wales pay band; slightly different percentages apply elsewhere.
4 The post-threshold standards are set out in STPCD Annex 1
5 This figure applies to the England and Wales pay band; slightly different percentages apply elsewhere
6 Op. Cit. STPCD 2012
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Figure 4.1
Progression on the main and upper pay scales
Estimates from the 2008/09 Survey of Teachers’ Pay (OME) showed:
•	 Over 98% of full-time teachers on M1-M5 received an annual 
increment.
•	 Around 45% of full-time teachers at the top of the main scale 
advanced from M6 to the UPS (over 90% of those applying were 
successful).
•	 Around 40% of full-time teachers on U1 progressed that year to U2 
and one-third of teachers on U2 progressed to U3.
Advanced Skills Teachers and Excellent Teachers
4.6 There are two further opportunities for higher pay for excellent teachers 
who wish to stay in the classroom. The Advanced Skills Teacher (AST) scheme 
provides higher salaries on a five point incremental spine for teachers who 
are appointed to specific posts involving improving the teaching skills of 
other classroom teachers, including 20% of time spent in outreach work. 
Progression on the spine is performance-related. The five points are selected 
by the governing body from the first 18 points of the leadership pay spine. 
AST teachers are subject to the same working time provisions as members of 
the leadership group, i.e. they are not subject to the limit of 1265 hours that 
applies to classroom teachers. The Excellent Teacher scheme (ET) provides a 
similar post-based role for teachers demonstrating long and broad pedagogic 
excellence within a school. ETs are paid a spot salary within a range (with no 
progression) and are subject to the same working time conditions as other 
classroom teachers.
4.7 Applications for both schemes are subject to external assessment against 
the relevant standards (post-threshold, advanced skills or excellent teachers’ 
standards7). There are just fewer than 4,000 ASTs in England, of whom 27% 
work in primary schools, 69% in secondary schools8, 3% in special schools and 
2% are centrally employed by local authorities. There are 166 ETs in England, 
of whom 35% work in primary schools, 60% in secondary schools, 3% in 
special schools and 2% are centrally employed by local authorities. There are no 
ETs in Welsh schools (figures on ASTs in Wales are not available).
Pay at selected career points
4.8 About one quarter of full-time primary teachers and over half of full-time 
secondary teachers receive some form of payment (e.g. a Teaching and Learning 
Responsibility payment (TLR) or a Special Educational Needs (SEN) allowance 
for taking on an additional responsibility) in addition to their basic salary. The 
earnings of individual teachers vary significantly according to geographic pay 
band, level of progression and whether they have been awarded an allowance. 
However, it is possible to illustrate the current potential for progression for a 
new recruit as follows (England and Wales figures – London equivalents would 
be higher):
7 Op. Cit. STPCD 2012
8 Figures include secondary academies. Figures relate to November 2010
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•	 Newly Qualified Teacher (NQT): £21,588
•	 After 5 years teaching: £31,552
•	 Substantial and sustained achievement as classroom teacher (around 10 
years experience) plus line management responsibilities (U3 plus a TLR 
of, say, £9,000): £45,756
•	 Advanced Skills Teacher (e.g. leading the teaching of numeracy): in the 
range £37,461 to £56,950).
4.9 All pay and progression arrangements for teachers (and the leadership 
group) are set out in the statutory School Teachers’ Pay and Conditions 
Document (STPCD). They include detailed provisions on eligibility, 
arrangements for starting pay, progression and assessment against the relevant 
standards. In our view, the level of detail, prescription and complexity results in 
an opaque document that is not easily accessible for teachers, head teachers 
and governing bodies or potential new recruits.
Teacher standards and performance appraisal
4.10 Current arrangements for performance-based progression on the upper 
pay scale rely on effective performance appraisal, linked to objectives and 
standards. There have been recent changes to both standards and appraisal.
4.11 Earlier this year the Department accepted proposals following an 
independent review9 for a new set of Teachers’ Standards in England, which 
were introduced from September 2012. The Department also welcomed the 
proposed Master Teacher standard, noting the Review Group’s observation that 
it should be an aspirational standard that should not be linked to pay. The 
Welsh Government has its own standards for teachers in Wales10. The existing 
standards for post-threshold, Excellent Teachers and Advanced Skills Teachers 
remain in place for teachers in both England and Wales for pay purposes. 
However, the Department invited us in this remit to consider the removal of 
these standards11.
4.12 New Appraisal Regulations came into effect in September 201212. The 
Department told us the changes would better enable schools to make decisions 
about rewarding performance as teachers would have to be assessed each year 
against the relevant standards and their objectives. Consultees stressed, and 
we endorse, the importance of a positive performance management culture 
in schools. Our view is that appraisal works best when it involves a two-way 
professional dialogue with a strong focus on self-evaluation and professional 
development.
4.13 Both teacher and head teacher unions emphasised the need for a 
clear and consistently applied framework and a clear understanding on 
both sides on setting objectives and targets, including for development. We 
heard concerns from consultees that the new standards could be open to 
inconsistent interpretation and that greater clarity was needed on expected 
levels of competence at a particular level of seniority. Several consultees also 
9 Letter from Michael Gove to Sally Coates 12 December 2011 at: <http://www.education.gov.uk/schools/
teachingandlearning/reviewofstandards/a00192172/review-of-teachers-standards-first-report>
10 Practising Teacher Standards and Practising Teacher Standards for Newly Qualified Teachers. Available at:  
http://wales.gov.uk/docs/dcells/publications/110830profstandardsen.pdf
11 Post-threshold, ET and AST standards
12 S.I. 2012/115, The Education (School Teachers’ Appraisal) (England) Regulations 2012
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commented on the need for training and/or support to help schools undertake 
performance management. We take account of these important considerations 
in framing our recommendations and in our observations in Chapter 6 on 
enabling more effective use of pay flexibilities.
Relevant research evidence
4.14 We set out the broader evidence base in Chapter 2. Of particular 
relevance to this chapter are the ORC research13 findings that both head 
teachers and chairs of governing bodies sought greater flexibility to enable 
appropriate reward for high performing teachers. Some commented on the need 
for closer links between pay and performance and for greater rigour in access to, 
and progress through, the upper pay scale.
4.15 We also noted the IES case studies14 on different approaches to pay 
progression in other sectors and professions, which informed our thinking 
on pay progression for teachers. Most of the case study organisations sought 
to provide a stronger link between pay and performance, with reward for 
contribution or performance rather than time served. Most had introduced pay 
systems providing scope for differential levels of pay. The report illustrated pay 
stages15: broadly an entry stage where staff were developing their skills and 
capabilities; a contribution stage, where staff were fully contributing; and a high 
value stage, where staff were rewarded for exceptional skill. We see value in 
such an approach.
4.16 International evidence also offers some insights which we reported in 
Chapter 2. This included OECD commentary16 which found that credentials and 
years of experience themselves were weak indicators of teacher effectiveness 
and effective evaluation and professional development were also needed. 
The OECD also noted that most countries which offer an additional payment 
for outstanding performance base decisions on the nuanced judgments of 
professional colleagues who, in turn, base their opinions on multiple sources 
of data, only some of which are measured in any formal way, although it 
acknowledged difficulty in distinguishing the impact made by an individual 
teacher.
4.17 The House of Commons Education Committee has recently commented 
that the comparative impact of outstanding teachers is so great (in terms of 
improved pupil outcomes) that the potential difficulties in introducing a pay 
system which rewards those teachers who add most value must be overcome17. 
A 2011 study for the Sutton Trust showed that improving the effectiveness 
of teachers would have a major impact on the performance of the country’s 
schools18. It concluded that a more flexible promotion and pay system…. would 
have the potential to attract and retain more high quality applicants into the 
profession 19.
13 Infogroup/ORC International (2011) Teachers’ Pay Issues: research findings 2010
14 IES (2012) Case Studies on Pay Progression
15 Pay stages are sometimes known as pay zones, but we use the former term to avoid confusion with geographically 
defined pay zones
16 OECD (2011) Building a High-Quality Teaching Profession – Lessons from around the World Chapter 3
17 House of Commons Education Committee (2012) Great teachers: attracting, training and retaining the best Ninth 
Report of Session 2010-12 paragraph 121
18 Sutton Trust (2011) Improving the impact of teachers on pupil achievements in the UK – interim findings page 2
19 Ibid. page 12
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Views and evidence from the Department and consultees
4.18 In paragraphs 4.19 to 4.40 below we set out the positions expressed by 
the Department and by consultees on strengthening the link between pay and 
performance, including progression. We cover their respective evidence on the 
detailed aspects we considered, including progression on the main and upper 
pay scales, reward beyond the upper pay scale and performance management.
The Department’s views on linking teachers’ pay to performance
4.19 One of the Secretary of State’s objectives for teachers’ pay reform is to 
develop arrangements which reward good performance and attract the highest 
performing graduates and professionals into teaching, given the evidence that 
high quality teachers drive up pupils’ achievement. The Department said there 
was a need to improve the quality of both new and existing teachers and that 
it was crucial that the pay system enabled head teachers to reward the best 
teachers who can have the biggest impact on pupil outcomes, particularly for 
pupils from disadvantaged backgrounds.
4.20 The Department argued that the current link between performance and 
reward was weak and the present system primarily rewarded time served. It 
cited research20 which found that virtually all full-time teachers on the main 
scale progressed to the next point. It said the current arrangements for pay 
progression limited the ability of schools to use their pay budgets to reward 
good teacher performance and raise standards. The Secretary of State said that 
new graduates had an expectation of initial pay progression in the early years 
and acknowledged a need for a minimum starting salary and reassurance of 
progression.
4.21 The Department did not make a detailed proposal for strengthening the 
link between pay and performance, but its five models illustrated a range of 
options, all of which would give head teachers greater or complete discretion on 
pay, including progression.
4.22 The Department also noted there was an urgent need to address the 
recruitment and retention of high-quality school leaders, citing research 
suggesting that school leadership was second only to classroom teaching as an 
influence on pupil learning, although it did not provide any separate evidence 
on leadership pay. We comment in Chapter 7 on the desirability of a further 
remit on this.
Consultees’ views and evidence
Performance and progression – general comments
4.23 Some consultees sought changes to the current arrangements. NAHT 
said there was too much automaticity of progression. NEOST similarly sought 
a stronger link between pay and performance, arguing that under current 
arrangements progression was virtually automatic for main scale teachers 
unless they were subject to capability procedures. It argued there should be 
incremental pay increases based on performance, although it saw a case for 
automatic pay progression for new teachers for the first three years. It also 
sought more scope to reward and incentivise exceptional performance.
20 ORC(2009) Survey of Teachers’ Pay 2008
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4.24 NGA said that progression should not be automatic and stressed the 
need for robust performance appraisal, with appropriate training for all those 
involved in appraisal, although it acknowledged that some governors did not 
support performance-related pay. NGA said an additional pay scale for middle/
line managers would be helpful as line management was often undervalued in 
schools.
4.25 All the teacher unions noted there were links between pay and 
performance in the current system, but views differed on the extent to which 
they needed strengthening. ASCL thought the existing system generally worked 
successfully. Several of the classroom teacher unions said the existing links 
between performance and pay were sufficient, citing the ability to pay double 
increments, the ability to withhold progression, access to the UPS and the 
ability to award increments early on the UPS.
4.26 Four unions (ATL, NUT, UCAC, Voice) provided a joint submission setting 
out their fundamental opposition to the extension of performance-related 
pay, citing recent OECD evidence21 which suggested no relationship between 
performance pay and pupil outcomes. They also noted OECD evidence that level 
of pay was key. They said differential reward for individual performance would 
undermine the importance of collaborative working and it was impossible to 
differentiate the impact of individual teachers on pupils. They noted there were 
already sufficient flexibilities, e.g. to award double increments.
4.27 Some classroom teacher unions argued that devolution of pay and 
progression arrangements to individual schools risked inconsistent and unfair 
application and potential discrimination. NUT went further, arguing that the 
existing arrangements for performance-based pay progression were complex, 
created inequity and discrimination and should be removed. NUT was opposed 
in principle to the concept of linking pay to performance and considered 
any denial of progression would be seen as a punishment. It saw speed of 
progression as the key competing characteristic of other graduate professions. 
ATL, NASUWT and NUT all pointed to a lack of evidence on the benefits of 
performance-related pay and cited various pieces of research suggesting that it 
did not have a strong motivational impact.
4.28 ASCL noted the current system contained sufficient discretion and 
argued that structural changes to the pay system would be a distraction, a point 
also made by NASUWT. During oral evidence ASCL said it took a pragmatic 
approach, believing that more explicit linking of pay and performance was 
unlikely to be feasible given current budget constraints and the possible 
negative impact on already fragile teacher morale. It raised concerns that 
pay-related decisions would be open to challenge and would lead to greater 
bureaucracy.
4.29 NASUWT said the current arrangements for pay progression helped 
to secure recruitment, retention and motivation and held the view that any 
failure to link progression to performance was due to ineffective performance 
management practice. It rejected the view that high-performing systems 
elsewhere were successful due to performance pay. It said teachers improved 
with experience and should be rewarded accordingly. Although it accepted 
21 OECD (2012) PISA in Focus 16: Does performance-based pay improve teaching?
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in principle there was differential performance, it considered the current 
arrangements lacked the rigour to ensure well-based decisions and said 
financial constraints would be a barrier to effectiveness.
4.30 UCAC commented on the potential confusion between the Master Teacher 
standard and the Master Teacher Qualification in Wales.
4.31 The Welsh Government said there was currently little or no link between 
pay and performance in Wales and was not convinced that one would be 
productive. It said the integrated system of professional standards, professional 
development and performance management in Wales would develop teachers 
and maintain their ability to progress, without needing to link pay and 
performance. During oral evidence the Welsh Government supported faster 
progression for very competent teachers but said this would need to be allied to 
robust performance management.
Performance and progression on the Main Scale
4.32 Several teacher unions commented on the need for new entrants to have 
clarity and certainty on pay prospects. Some of the teacher unions and the 
Welsh Government recognised that teachers developed at different rates, and 
most considered teachers were generally fully competent after five to six years, 
suggesting M6 was the market rate for a teacher. ATL argued that progression 
on the main scale recognised competencies gained and said that extending 
performance-related progression to the main scale would deter graduates 
from joining the profession. ASCL viewed the incremental scale as useful in 
motivating and rewarding teachers. NUT proposed the main scale and UPS 
should be merged and extended.
4.33 NAHT proposed a unified nine point scale, with no threshold for UPS, as 
it considered full performance-related progression at every stage would make a 
threshold redundant. It suggested progression could be based on satisfactory 
performance for teachers in their early years and good performance for more 
experienced teachers. It took the view that accelerated progression for excellent 
performance would aid recruitment.
Access to, and expectations of, teachers on the Upper Pay Scale
4.34 NEOST commented that the process for accessing UPS needed 
simplification and greater rigour. It sought the ability to move teachers from 
the UPS to the main pay scale where performance fell short, with appropriate 
safeguards (to ensure any such downgrading was related to performance and 
not, for example, due to budgetary pressures), a proposal rejected by some 
of the classroom teacher unions. It said the permanency of pay points made 
it difficult for experienced teachers re-entering the profession to get supply 
teacher posts.
4.35 The classroom teacher unions were unanimous in disagreeing with other 
consultees’ perceptions of automaticity around the UPS and voiced concerns 
that some teachers eligible for the UPS were prevented from accessing it due 
to funding constraints in schools, which undermined teacher morale. NASUWT 
pointed out that over 50% of eligible teachers did not progress to the UPS.
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4.36 NASUWT proposed automatic assessment for teachers at the threshold 
and Voice suggested the UPS should be available to all teachers who met the 
criteria as it considered pay progression was relatively slow compared with some 
other professions. It said UPS points should remain permanent and portable.
4.37 The teacher unions observed a distinction between UPS teachers and 
those on the main scale. They suggested that UPS teachers made a wider 
contribution to the school through responsibilities for pedagogy, shared their 
experiences with colleagues and coached and mentored other teachers. ATL, 
UCAC and Voice saw the UPS as a career path for experienced teachers wishing 
to remain in the classroom. BATOD supported the current system of UPS 
progression and proposed quality assuring teachers of the deaf to ensure the 
continuation of high quality teaching.
4.38 ASCL said teachers on the UPS should contribute more widely to the 
school. Both ASCL and NAHT acknowledged that access to, and progress on, 
the UPS had sometimes lacked rigour but ASCL said the new performance 
management and capability procedures would support school leaders in 
addressing this. It proposed there should be greater recognition for teachers on 
the UPS, similar to chartered status in other professions.
Views on Advanced Skills Teachers and Excellent Teachers
4.39 There was general support for retention of the AST scheme, although 
NAHT proposed combining AST and ET roles into a ‘lead practitioner’ role 
(a proposal supported by ASCL but which NASUWT explicitly rejected) and 
commented on the need for such roles to be available in primary schools. NAHT 
envisaged the pay scale being extended to 13/15 points to accommodate this. 
NUT suggested the local authority ‘advisory teacher’ model as an alternative as 
it considered some mechanism for sharing expertise between schools should be 
retained, given fragmentation of local authority support which was affecting the 
use of AST posts, a point echoed by both ATL and Voice. Voice suggested the 
role could be rewarded through TLRs or by extending the UPS.
4.40 The Welsh Government said the UPS scale was useful and wanted the 
ability to reward high-performing teachers without management responsibilities 
through an extended pay scale, noting that ASTs were seldom used and there 
were no Excellent Teacher posts in Wales.
Our analysis and recommendations
Our overarching approach
(i) the case for strengthening the link between performance and pay
4.41 STRB has been asked on several occasions to consider how teachers’ 
pay might be more closely related to their performance. It first expressed a 
view supporting performance-related pay arrangements in 199222 and has 
regularly made recommendations accordingly – most recently, in the Sixteenth 
Report23. We note this has also been the view of successive Governments (see 
Chapter 1) and that more recently the House of Commons Education Committee 
recommended a pay system which rewards those teachers who add most 
value to pupil performance. As we noted earlier, the Committee acknowledged 
22 STRB(1992) First Report, HMSO (Cm 1806) paragraph 62
23 STRB (2007) Sixteenth Report, TSO (Cm 7007) paragraph 6.39
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potential difficulties, but considered the comparative impact of outstanding 
teachers was so great the difficulties must be overcome. It is our firm view that 
as well as higher reward for the very best teachers, there should be incentives in 
the pay system for all teachers to improve their teaching skills.
4.42 Looking at wider organisational practice, we noted that performance-
based pay and progression arrangements are a feature in over 85% of private 
sector organisations, with a Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development 
(CIPD) survey suggesting 77% of management /professional staff were 
subject to performance-related pay24. A significant proportion of public sector 
organisations are also using performance-related pay.
4.43 The challenge is how in practice to ensure pay and performance are 
linked more effectively for teachers. The principle of performance-related 
progression is already established in all parts of the framework above the main 
scale and we heard from some consultees that earlier concerns about lack of 
rigour on the upper pay scale are now being addressed within schools.
4.44 We acknowledge that simplistic, results-based systems do not fully 
reflect an individual’s contribution to the school. We accept the collegiate 
nature of teaching, but do not see this as a barrier to recognition of individual 
performance based on appraisal. We note that collegiate behaviour is 
recognised and rewarded in some performance management systems25. We 
also note schools have for many years had performance appraisal systems. The 
Department’s recently simplified model performance appraisal policy now offers 
a framework which can be developed by individual schools to meet their specific 
needs and circumstances.
4.45 The teacher appraisal regulations in England and Wales require 
assessment against both standards and objectives and so provide for a broad 
based assessment. We note that Section 8 of the Teachers’ Standards includes 
wider professional responsibilities, which provides a useful focus for assessment 
of a teacher’s contribution to the whole school26. The simple standards and 
appraisal frameworks now in place should enable appropriate, rounded 
judgements on an individual’s contribution.
4.46 We have considered carefully the views of consultees and other research 
and evidence from our visits to schools and local authorities. These have 
reinforced our view that there are strong arguments for extending the link 
between pay and performance from the UPS to the main scale. We noted in 
particular the support from NAHT, NEOST and NGA for a stronger link, echoing 
views expressed during our visits and found in the ORC research. We explored 
the concept of differentiation between teachers’ performance during oral 
representation sessions. While some consultees accepted the principle, most 
were concerned that there was insufficient rigour in the appraisal system to 
ensure decisions were well-founded.
4.47 We set out in Chapter 2 a range of evidence on the relationship between 
performance pay and pupil outcomes, whilst acknowledging that care was 
24 CIPD (2012) Reward Management: Annual Survey Report 2012
25 IES (2012) Case studies on Pay Progression
26 DfE website: <http://www.education.gov.uk/schools/teachingandlearning/reviewofstandards/a00192172/review-of-
teachers-standards-first-report>
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needed in interpreting international evidence and individual studies. We 
noted evidence that pay levels were important, and that speed of progression 
through the pay scales could also help schools to recruit and retain higher 
calibre teachers who have a positive impact on pupil outcomes27. Some studies 
suggested there were other levers for improving teacher performance, such 
as raising the status of teaching, offering real career prospects and giving 
teachers responsibility as professionals and leaders of reform. We also noted 
a widely-quoted OECD study28 which found no relationship at aggregate level 
between pupil performance and the use of pay systems with performance-based 
elements, but we consider there is a need for caution in its interpretation. 
Evidence on the experience of changes in Sweden suggested pay had been 
used to reward commitment and additional tasks but the absence of a clear 
framework for evaluating the performance of teachers (now being addressed) 
appeared to deter school leaders from establishing a closer linkage between pay 
and performance29.
4.48 As we set out below, our proposals are rooted in clear frameworks for 
teacher standards and performance appraisal and build on the experience of 
managing performance-based progression to, and within, the upper pay scale. 
Accordingly, they will enable head teachers and governing bodies to extend their 
expertise in managing performance-based progression within a relatively familiar 
framework and should also help maintain the confidence of teachers at a time 
of change. We also provide scope for schools to tailor pay policies to meet the 
specific needs of the school.
4.49 We acknowledge consultees’ concerns that at present there is not a level-
playing field for schools in terms of funding. While we do not believe this should 
prevent change, we do attach great importance to further reform of the national 
funding formula. This drives budget allocation and should enable school 
budgets in future to be more closely related to pupil needs.
(ii) the context for our proposals on progression
4.50 Our guiding principles for the teacher pay framework, set out in Chapter 
2, include rewarding excellence; offering appropriate reward for good classroom 
teachers at all career stages; ensuring progression reflects improvements 
in performance and contribution; providing greater autonomy for schools 
and simplifying the existing pay system. Before setting out our detailed 
recommendations we comment on the broad framework in which our proposals 
will operate.
4.51 Taking account of our guiding principles we considered first what the 
overall classroom teacher pay framework should provide in terms of a career 
offer which is both attractive to a graduate profession and meets the needs of 
the employer. We believe it should:
•	 provide a simple and flexible framework within which schools can deploy 
teachers effectively to deliver the school’s objectives and reward them 
appropriately for their contributions;
27 Dolton, P and Marcenaro–Gutierrez,O (2011) Teachers’ pay and pupil performance in CentrePiece, Autumn 2011, 
Centre for Economic Performance at LSE
28 OECD (2012) PISA in Focus 16: Does performance-based pay improve teaching? page 4
29 OECD (2011) OECD Reviews of Evaluation and Assessment in Education, Sweden page 68
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•	 provide clarity about initial expectations, and potential career paths 
and associated earnings, so teaching can compete effectively with other 
professions seeking high quality graduates;
•	 promote a strong emphasis on opportunities for professional 
development and on contribution to the school;
•	 enable the most able classroom teachers to be well rewarded if they stay 
in the classroom; and
•	 incentivise those who wish to develop their wider leadership potential.
4.52 Second, we believe that judgements on performance, and therefore 
decisions on progression for classroom teachers, should be made annually 
and rooted in the relevant standards and performance appraisal frameworks 
in England and Wales. We noted the concerns of some consultees about 
differentiation between teachers for pay purposes. We also noted evidence 
that managers generally need time to understand and implement performance-
based pay systems, particularly in collaborative and team-based occupations. 
We make some observations in Chapter 6 about the importance of good quality 
appraisal dialogue and professional development. We also comment on the role 
of governing bodies in assuring the robustness of decisions on pay based on 
performance appraisal, including that they are objectively justified and in line 
with the school’s pay policy.
4.53 Mindful of the IES research30 into pay progression that found many 
organisations operated progression across broad pay stages, we explored with 
consultees during oral representation sessions what progression arrangements 
were appropriate to the teaching profession. They generally agreed an 
expectation of progression through the main scale was reasonable. However, 
some consultees commented adversely on the apparent automaticity of 
progression on the main scale, resulting in some teachers receiving a significant 
increase for merely satisfactory performance (the value of one incremental point 
is 8%)31.
4.54 We note that guidance32 issued by the former Rewards and Incentive 
Group (RIG) in 2009 indicated that annual increments should apply for main 
scale teachers, unless an individual was in capability proceedings. In practice 
this meant automatic progression unless a teacher had been notified their 
performance was unsatisfactory. Thus, it was necessary to trigger the capability 
procedure if an individual was not to be awarded an incremental point. We 
also note that the existing scope to award an additional increment for excellent 
performance is a blunt tool and seldom used.
4.55 It is our view that the current arrangements for progression constrain 
schools in the degree of flexibility they have to reward teachers appropriately 
in line with performance against standards and objectives and taking account 
of contribution to the school. It also restricts pay progression by prescribing 
the amount of increase permissible (other than in exceptional cases) thus 
limiting the ambition of individuals and the attraction of the profession to 
high calibre graduates and career changers. This leaves head teachers with 
little scope for any shading of progression to reflect differences in performance 
30 Op. Cit. IES
31 England and Wales pay band
32 RIG (2009) Teachers and Head teachers’ Performance Management Guidance paragraph 5.43
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between members of the same peer group, which would be expected in many 
professions.
4.56 Given the central importance of good teaching to the life chances of 
young people, we believe it is important that any system of pay progression can 
be justified to parents, teachers and other taxpayers. Our recommendations 
for stronger links between pay and progression are a natural consequence of 
our recommendations over several years. They are simply a development of the 
arrangements existing elsewhere in the teachers’ pay system. They also build on 
good practice found in other organisations and in some other high-performing 
school systems.
4.57 In reaching our conclusions we also noted that it is now some twenty 
years since schools took responsibility for their own financial management 
and for recruitment of staff. We consider that giving schools responsibility for 
teachers’ pay, within a broad framework, is a logical next step in providing 
schools with autonomy to do what is best for each school to improve educational 
outcomes for pupils.
4.58 We are mindful of consultees’ concerns about the implementation of 
new arrangements, but also note that a quarter of new entrants to the teaching 
profession are mature entrants33, some of whom will already have experience 
of performance-related pay systems. By building on arrangements already in 
place our recommendations will maintain the confidence of school leaders in 
their ability to manage the system, enabling them to draw on their experience of 
managing performance-based progression on the upper pay scale.
4.59 Before turning to our detailed recommendations, we reiterate our 
view that it will be important for school leaders to provide an environment 
which embeds a culture of excellence, continuous professional development 
and performance management 34 and that teachers themselves should have 
prime responsibility for their own professional development. In Chapter 6 we 
comment on the critical importance of high quality appraisal and development 
opportunities to improve the quality of teaching, a view supported by research.
Our detailed recommendations on linking pay with performance
4.60 We propose the retention of a broad national framework for classroom 
teachers’ pay, but with a simplified structure and greater autonomy for schools 
to determine the level of pay progression. Our recommendations provide a single 
pathway for performance-based progression from entry on the main pay scale, 
through the upper pay scale, subject to simplified criteria at the threshold, and 
the possibility of higher paid posts beyond the upper pay scale, at the discretion 
of the school.
33 Teaching Agency Performance Profiles 2010/11 – aged over 29
34 STRB (2005) Fifteenth Report, TSO (Cm 6663) paragraph 7.29
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4.61 Our main recommendations are:
•	 Differentiated performance-based progression on the main pay scale to 
enable teachers to progress at different speeds, with higher rewards and 
more rapid progression for the most able teachers.
•	 More flexible performance-based progression to and within the upper 
pay scale, assessed against substantially simplified criteria, enabling 
abolition of the bureaucratic post threshold standards.
•	 Local discretion to pay a higher salary to the most successful teachers if 
a post (akin to AST) is required and meets simple yet demanding criteria 
on leading improvement of teaching skills.
4.62 We set out below how each recommendation might be implemented. Our 
overall intention is to offer a simple framework for local decision-making, but 
provide a greater degree of confidence as to career expectations within a broad 
national framework than would be offered by a completely deregulated model.
Progression within the main and upper pay scales
The main scale
4.63 Our view is that the main scale should, as now, offer new entrants to 
the profession the clear prospect of increasing pay to the maximum, subject 
to performance against objectives and to continuing development of their 
skills and competencies. We heard from consultees that typically NQTs take 
three to five years to develop full competence against the standards and that 
to reach M6 (which many regarded as the ‘rate for the job’) they should have 
gained experience in a range of circumstances. Most consultees agreed a 
performance link was well established on the UPS and in the leadership group 
pay arrangements.
4.64 We believe that as for the upper pay scale, the main scale should have 
a clear link between performance and progression, which would enable reward 
to take account of genuine differences between individuals’ performance 
and development, and offer faster progression to the most able. We therefore 
recommend differentiated performance-based progression on the main scale.
4.65 We considered a number of options for differentiating progression awards:
•	 Do nothing. This would leave the current system unchanged, enabling 
differentiation only by the award of an additional increment for excellent 
performance (or none where an individual was in capability proceedings). 
Both provisions are used only rarely at present. This would not address 
the apparent automaticity in the system which is of concern to many 
school leaders. It would do little to promote higher rewards and more 
rapid progression for the most able teachers.
•	 Convert the existing main scale points to become purely reference points 
which would indicate the pay level that might be achieved after a certain 
period, subject to good performance and development. This would offer 
greater flexibility for schools to set pay policies which allow differential 
awards according to the performance and development of individuals, 
including the option of making no progression award if one was not 
justified.
•	 Simply set a pay minimum and maximum, and give schools complete 
flexibility to award progression within that scale. An immediate move 
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to complete flexibility within a minimum and maximum would, in our 
view, place significant burdens on schools, given the need to develop 
transparent and consistent arrangements, without the “scaffolding” 
offered by the existing points.
4.66 On balance, we consider reference points would be the approach best 
suited to schools at present. This would enable schools to award progression 
increases as they judge appropriate in the circumstances, for example, awarding 
more or less than a whole point. A teacher could expect to reach the top of the 
pay scale in about five years, as now, and the best teachers could expect to 
reach the top of the scale more quickly. This approach would provide clear pay 
expectations for both graduate entrants and career changers.
4.67 We do not consider it appropriate to prescribe a particular method of 
linking pay progression to schools’ performance appraisal, given the wide 
variation in their circumstances and our wish to enhance schools’ autonomy. 
We consider that schools should set out in their pay policy35 how progression 
would be determined, thus ensuring transparency and minimising the risk of 
any bias. We would expect schools to tailor their pay policies to their particular 
circumstances, such as school improvement priorities, whilst providing teachers 
with a degree of confidence about their career expectations.
4.68 Schools would need to develop systematic and transparent arrangements 
to ensure that decisions were properly documented, could be explained to 
individuals and were objectively justified. These would build on existing 
performance appraisal arrangements. Schools which have such systems in 
place could move rapidly to use greater flexibility. Others might welcome the 
opportunity to rely on reference points initially as they put arrangements in 
place.
4.69 We recommend the following on detailed implementation and that the 
Department consider how best to give effect to our intentions in the STPCD or 
guidance:
•	 First, there should be a clear expectation that, subject to good 
performance and development, teachers on the main scale should 
progress to the maximum. Our proposals are not intended to hold down 
pay across the board but individuals will progress at different rates.
•	 Second, it should be possible for schools to award no progression in a 
given year without the automatic implication of capability proceedings. 
This might be the case if a teacher had needed substantial support 
during the year but by the later stages was performing effectively in 
relation to objectives and the teacher standards.
•	 Third, particular considerations apply to progression following 
satisfactory completion of the induction period. We heard from 
consultees that NQTs are closely managed during their induction period 
and those who are not meeting expectations will not progress. If they 
do succeed in meeting the standard, it is right they should continue to 
progress to a level equivalent to the current M2, as now.
•	 Fourth, it should be made clear that all pay progression should be 
dependent on a written recommendation based on the timely completion 
35 All maintained schools are required to have a pay policy, approved by the governing body, which sets out the basis 
on which it determines teachers’ pay in accordance with STPCD
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of an annual performance appraisal and in line with the pay policy of 
the school. The current model appraisal policy reference to written 
recommendations ‘where relevant’ has the potential to generate 
confusion and we recommend all pay progression should be dependent 
upon a written recommendation.
4.70 In order to ensure successful implementation of differential progression, 
we recommend the Department develop guidance or a tool-kit for leadership 
teams who need help developing a systematic and transparent approach. It 
should be open to leadership teams to adopt other approaches if they wished. 
We believe schools should be able to adopt appropriate systems for their 
particular circumstances.
The upper pay scale and threshold assessment
4.71 We received evidence that designated career stages are part of 
progression in many professions and contribute to the status and attraction of 
those professions. We believe there should be capacity for greater reward for 
those more senior teachers who make a greater contribution to the whole school, 
and beyond. We recommend there continue to be an upper pay scale.
4.72 As now, progression from the main scale to the upper pay scale should 
not be automatic, but should require an application from the individual. To 
be eligible for consideration we recommend that teachers must be highly 
competent classroom teachers who have already progressed substantially 
towards the maximum of the main scale. Following implementation of more 
flexible progression through the main scale we consider it would be an 
unnecessary constraint on flexibility if a teacher had to be on the maximum, 
but the intention is that eligible teachers should have progressed close to 
that level before being considered for the upper pay scale. We recommend 
that progression to the upper pay scale should be dependent upon rigorous 
assessment by the head teacher against two simple criteria. Candidates should 
have demonstrated:
•	 substantial and sustained achievement of objectives, appropriate skills 
and competence in all elements of the Teachers’ Standards, and
•	 the potential and commitment to undertake professional duties which 
make a wider contribution (which involves working with adults) beyond 
their own classroom.
4.73 We consider these criteria will enable schools to distinguish sufficiently 
between a teacher on the main scale and a teacher on the upper pay scale and 
accordingly recommend abolition of the post-threshold pay standard which is 
unnecessarily complex and bureaucratic. For teachers already on the upper pay 
scale, we believe the new teachers’ standards provide a good basis for appraisal 
at this level, taking account of the expectations set out in the above criteria. 
This will provide a more integrated approach to progression through the main 
and upper pay scales.
Criteria for progression within the upper pay scale
4.74 The upper pay scale is a relatively short scale (£34,181 to £36,756 
nationally36) and we consider that the existing minimum and maximum points 
36 i.e. in England and Wales; the ranges are slightly higher in Inner and Outer London and the Fringe
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of the upper pay scale will offer sufficient structure in the pay framework at this 
level. Accordingly we recommend that the amount and timing of any progression 
recommendations should be at the school’s discretion, reflecting individuals’ 
differential contributions to the school. There is already a stronger link between 
pay and performance on the upper pay scale and our proposals increase the 
flexibility to differentiate performance and reward in line with contribution to 
the school.
4.75 As a consequence of this flexibility we also recommend discontinuing 
the requirement for two consecutive successful appraisals at this level, i.e. 
a teacher should not have to stay on the same salary for two years if their 
performance and contribution warrants further progress. This change will enable 
those highly competent teachers who make a wider contribution to the school 
to receive a higher salary, with those who make the greatest contribution able 
to reach the scale maximum more rapidly. Given that the interval between 
the minimum and maximum of this scale is currently quite narrow, it will 
be important to ensure in future that the upper pay scale is at a level which 
continues to incentivise teachers in mid-career.
Consequential recommendation on progression on the main and upper pay 
scales
4.76 The implication of giving schools greater discretion on performance-based 
progression awards is that individual pay will no longer relate to a fixed point on 
a scale, but will reflect the performance of a particular teacher in the context 
of a particular school. It will not therefore be appropriate to regard a salary 
awarded in one school as the basis for all future postings, if a teacher chose to 
move. Accordingly, we recommend that there should be no obligation on schools 
to match a teacher’s existing salary on either the main or upper pay scales. In 
practice, schools will wish to advertise posts with the opportunity for salaries 
that are commensurate with a teacher’s skills and experience in order to attract 
the best teacher available for a particular post.
Discretion to pay above the upper pay scale for specific posts
4.77 We remain of the view that there should be an option for schools to 
reward the most successful teachers who wish to remain in the classroom rather 
than moving into leadership positions. We are mindful of the wide support 
among consultees for the AST scheme and of the House of Commons Education 
Committee’s view37 that clarity about both career paths and pay was necessary 
to attract high quality graduates and retain the most able teachers in the 
profession. However we consider that it is confusing to have both the Advanced 
Skills and Excellent Teacher schemes and note that the latter is little used.
4.78 We also note that the detailed pay standards associated with the 
respective schemes add complexity to the STPCD which, as we argue in 
Chapter 5, needs radical simplification. Following the recommendations of 
the Independent Review of Teacher Standards, the Secretary of State has 
introduced a single teacher standard. In our view this provides a suitable basis 
against which all teachers can be assessed. We note also that the proposed 
Master Teacher standard was not intended to be a pay standard.
37 House of Commons Education Committee (2012) Great teachers: attracting, training and retaining the best Ninth 
Report of Session 2010-12 paragraph 109
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4.79 We believe that the pay framework should give schools discretion to offer 
specific, higher paid posts for outstanding classroom teachers. We consider 
such posts should represent the pinnacle of professionalism for classroom 
teachers, with commensurate reward. As now for AST and ET schemes, it would 
be dependent on a head teacher identifying a distinctive post for a teacher 
whose primary purpose is the modelling and leading improvement of teaching 
skills, such as a leading practitioner or principal teacher.
4.80 Accordingly we recommend schools should have discretion to create 
a post paying a salary higher than the maximum of the upper pay scale. Our 
intention is that a salary range appropriate to the specific post should be fixed 
within the range covered by the existing AST pay spine i.e. between £37,461 
and £56,950 nationally38, with analogous conditions. Any progression within 
the range fixed by the school would be entirely dependent upon performance. 
When determining the salary range, schools should take into account the 
challenge and demands of an individual post and be mindful of internal pay 
relativities. If a school creates more than one such post, the salary range should 
be determined separately for each post and the salary ranges need not be 
identical. Salaries at this level would be for the school specific post, and not 
portable between schools.
4.81 The criteria for appointment to such posts must include excellence in 
teaching, and a contribution to leading the improvement of teaching skills 
within and/or beyond the school. Those eligible would normally have a sustained 
track record of successful performance as a teacher on the upper pay scale. 
We consider it is for head teachers to decide whether or not such posts should 
contain an element of outreach. Since these posts focus on pedagogy rather 
than line management they would not normally attract TLR payments, but there 
should be no bar to their doing so.
4.82 Posts should be part of the school staffing structure and approved by the 
governing body, with the responsibilities for the post determined by individual 
schools, consistent with the criteria above. The school’s pay policy should 
include criteria for setting a pay range and for progression within the range. We 
consider it should be open to schools or groups of schools to choose the most 
appropriate designation for such posts e.g. principal teacher.
4.83 Consequent on these proposals for discretion to create specific posts 
above the upper pay scale, we recommend a range equivalent to the existing 
Advanced Skills Teacher, within which an individual range would be set. We 
recommend the Advanced Skills Teacher pay spine and Excellent Teacher pay 
range be discontinued, along with the associated standards.
Unqualified teachers’ scale
4.84 We heard little detailed evidence on the unqualified teachers scale. The 
Department’s models include the option of removing the distinction between 
qualified and unqualified teacher pay scales and we note that the Department 
has extended the freedom to employ unqualified teachers to academies39. 
The unions strongly opposed this on the grounds it would harm the status of 
38 With higher equivalent salaries in London and the Fringe
39 DfE press notice, 27 July 2012 available at <http://www.education.gov.uk/inthenews/inthenews/a00212396/
academies-to-have-same-freedom-as-free-schools-over-teachers>
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the profession. If a school is seeking to appoint on this scale, there is already 
substantial flexibility in determining where to position unqualified teachers, 
taking account of past experience. We consider there should also be flexibility 
in relation to progression and recommend school discretion in setting salaries 
within the existing minimum and maximum of the unqualified teachers’ scale; 
with the potential for differential performance-based progression within the 
school. We do not believe reference points are appropriate given the variety of 
circumstances of unqualified teachers. A school’s pay policy should set out how 
progression on the unqualified teachers’ scale will operate in the circumstances 
of that school.
Concluding comments: enablers of change
4.85 We believe our proposals are an evolution of existing arrangements. They 
are consistent with the wish of successive governments to reward those teachers 
who contribute most and to provide schools with greater autonomy to meet the 
particular needs of their pupils.
4.86 Our proposals will enable head teachers and governing bodies to move 
towards appropriate differentiation in taking pay decisions whilst providing 
a degree of confidence in a shared framework, compared with a completely 
de-regulated model. They reinforce the professional status of the teaching 
profession by allowing school leaders to use their professional judgment to meet 
the needs of pupils, allocating the budget as they think appropriate. They are 
intended to support the development of a culture that enables all teachers to 
be appropriately rewarded, with performance-based differentiation in pay, as is 
common in other graduate occupations.
4.87 These changes will require head teachers and line managers to deploy 
effective people management skills and to implement simple and transparent 
pay policies that include arrangements for progression. Greater freedom 
to increase pay based on performance, with the option to accelerate the 
progression of high performers, represents an important extension of existing 
provisions. It will be important that all individuals are clear about what will be 
expected of them. This will place obligations on the head teacher, line managers 
and individuals to communicate clearly. It will also underline the importance of 
timely agreement on objectives and well-evidenced performance appraisal.
4.88 We comment further in Chapter 6 on the central importance of effective 
appraisal arrangements in the context of reforms to progression. In our view 
it will also be important that these reforms on performance-based progression 
are implemented in a climate which also shows the same strong focus on high 
quality professional development opportunities as is found in other graduate 
professions.
4.89 The changes will also underline the existing requirement for governing 
bodies to have pay policies in place and hold head teachers to account for their 
recommendations on pay. An important consideration will be that governing 
bodies, and local authorities where they are the employer, are satisfied that 
head teacher recommendations on pay are well-founded and can be objectively 
justified to minimise the risk of challenge on grounds of equal pay.
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4.90 We recognise that increased autonomy on pay is associated with some 
risk of pay inflation. Overall school budgets will provide some constraint but 
it will be essential that leadership teams make robust and well-evidenced 
recommendations and that governing bodies hold head teachers to account for 
effective use of the pay budget. We set out in Chapter 6 some observations on 
governance. We also note that Ofsted’s new inspection framework should help 
encourage a clear focus on the relationship between pay progression decisions 
and quality of teaching in a school.
Unattached teachers
4.91 Our recommendations also apply to unattached teachers who are directly 
managed by local authorities. Local authorities are already required to have 
an appraisal policy for unattached teachers and a pay policy which should be 
linked to their appraisal system. Local authorities will therefore need to set out 
in their pay policy how appraisal will link to pay progression for unattached 
teachers.
Special considerations applying in Wales
4.92 We note that the Welsh Government operates slightly different 
arrangements for performance management, but its own guidance40 provides 
for the approach we have described above, linked to the relevant standards41 
in Wales. Our recommendations should therefore apply equally to teachers in 
England and Wales, based on their respective appraisal system and teacher 
standards. The Welsh Government might wish to consider whether there is a 
need for guidance on how the Practising Teacher Standards might be applied for 
all teachers in Wales, including teachers on post-threshold pay scales.
Summary of our recommendations
4.93 Our main recommendations, which provide for a single pathway through 
the main and upper pay scales, are as follows:
•	 Differentiated performance-based progression on the main pay scale to 
enable teachers to progress at different speeds, with higher rewards and 
more rapid progression for the most able teachers.
•	 More flexible performance-based progression to and within the upper 
pay scale, assessed against substantially simplified criteria, enabling 
abolition of the bureaucratic post threshold standards.
•	 Local discretion to pay a higher salary to the most successful teachers 
(akin to AST) if such a post is required and meets simple yet demanding 
criteria on leading improvement of teaching skills
4.94 Our detailed recommendations on implementation are:
•	 The existing points on the main scale should become purely reference 
points.
•	 The Department consider how to give effect to our detailed 
recommendations on implementation; including:
 – a clear expectation of progression to the maximum of the main scale, 
subject to good performance;
 – an option for no progression without the automatic implication of 
40 Welsh Government, Performance management for teachers Guidance document no: 073/2012
41 Practising Teacher Standards or the Practising Standards for Newly Qualified Teachers
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capability proceedings;
 – progression to reference point M2 for NQTs on successful completion 
of the induction period;
 – all pay progression be dependent on a written recommendation 
based on timely completion of an annual performance appraisal in 
line with the pay policy of a school.
•	 The Department develop guidance or a tool-kit to help schools develop 
systematic and transparent local approaches to pay progression.
•	 A basic eligibility requirement for teachers applying for the upper pay 
scale, who must be highly competent classroom teachers who have 
already progressed substantially towards the maximum of the main 
scale.
•	 Criteria for access to the upper pay scale requiring candidates to have 
demonstrated:
 – substantial and sustained achievement of objectives, appropriate 
skills and competence in all elements of the Teachers’ Standards, 
and
 – potential and commitment to undertake professional duties which 
make a wider contribution (which involves working with adults) 
beyond their own classroom.
•	 On the upper pay scale, the amount and timing of any progression 
recommendations should be at the school’s discretion, reflecting 
individuals’ differential contributions to the school.
•	 School discretion to create a post for a teacher whose primary purpose 
is the modelling and leading improvement of teaching skills. Such posts 
should have a salary range fixed within the range between £37,461 and 
£56,950 (nationally 42), taking account of the challenge of the post and 
of internal pay relativities, with progression increases entirely dependent 
upon performance.
•	 Discretion for schools to set salaries within the unqualified teachers’ 
scale without reference points and with performance-based progression.
4.95 We also make consequential recommendations as follows:
•	 No obligation for schools when recruiting to match a teacher’s existing 
salary on either the main or the upper pay scales.
•	 The requirement for two consecutive successful appraisals for 
progression purposes on the upper pay scale be discontinued.
•	 The existing post-threshold, AST and ET standards be abolished; and
•	 The AST pay spine and ET pay range be discontinued.
4.96 Taken together, we believe these recommendations will provide a more 
flexible national pay framework that is accessible and easily understood by 
teachers, head teachers and governing bodies and will enable substantial 
simplification of the STPCD. The table below sets out the recommended ranges 
and reference points (where applicable).
42 i.e. in England and Wales; the ranges are slightly higher in Inner and Outer London and the Fringe
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£ £ £ £
Minimum points (fixed)
1 21,588 27,000 25,117 22,626
Progression points for reference only
2 23,295 28,408 26,674 24,331
3 25,168 29,889 28,325 26,203
4 27,104 31,446 30,080 28,146
5 29,240 33,865 32,630 30,278
Maximum points (fixed)
6 31,552 36,387 35,116 32,588
Upper Pay Scale – between fixed minimum and maximum
Minimum 34,181  41,497 37,599 35,218
Maximum 36,756 45,000 40,433 37,795
Discretion for specific posts – between fixed minimum and maximum
Minimum43 37,461 44,540 40,433 38,493
Maximum 56,950 64,036 59,925 57,985
Unqualified Teacher Scale – between fixed minimum and maximum
Minimum 15,817 19,893 18,789 16,856
Maximum 25,016 29,088 27,992 26,052
43 




5.1 The Secretary of State’s remit letter asked us to recommend:
what other reforms should be made to teachers’ pay and conditions 
in order to raise the status of the profession and best support the 
recruitment and retention of high quality teachers in all schools.
5.2 This part of the remit potentially invites consideration of a wide range of 
issues: pay, working conditions, autonomy and professional development all bear 
on the status of the teaching profession. We consider that our recommendations 
in Chapters 3 and 4, on local pay and linking pay to performance, will, if 
implemented as a package, make a significant contribution to elevating the 
status of the teaching profession and supporting the recruitment and retention 
of high quality teachers in all schools. They offer greater flexibility within the 
security of a broad national framework, by enabling pay tailored to specific local 
or market needs and progression at all levels to be linked to performance and 
overall contribution, in line with other professions.
5.3 On professional development, we have already made clear our view that 
a strong focus on professional development is an essential complement to 
the sharper link between progression and performance. All the teacher unions 
and NEOST have also called for a stronger focus on high quality professional 
development. We underline in Chapter 6 how professional development should 
be a central feature of performance appraisal discussions.
5.4 We recognise that there is a case for further examination of how the 
existing pay and conditions framework might allow greater flexibility for schools 
to meet the needs of their pupils, whilst continuing to support the status of 
the teaching profession. Although the Department did not put forward specific 
proposals on teachers’ working conditions, the Secretary of State told us in 
oral evidence that he believed some elements of the teachers’ contract (such 
as ‘rarely cover’ and limits on teaching time) acted against the interests of 
the profession by undermining professionalism. In their evidence, the teacher 
unions emphasised the progress which had been made on ‘professionalisation’ 
following the National Agreement1 in 2003. The head teacher unions, 
however, saw this as unnecessarily prescriptive and wanted conditions to be 
more flexible, as befits a profession. Given the absence of proposals from the 
Department, and the substantial issues we have already considered in this 
remit, we consider it would be better to wait for a future remit in which we 
could give proper consideration to the range of issues on working conditions. 
This will also have the benefit of enabling schools to become familiar with pay 
changes we recommend in this remit, before introducing any further changes.
1 DfES (2003) Raising Standards and Tackling Workload: a National Agreement
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5.5 Our focus for this remit has therefore been on those elements of the 
existing pay framework for which we received evidence to suggest there were 
current barriers to recruiting and retaining high quality teachers; where existing 
provisions in the framework could be clarified or simplified to make them more 
effective; and where changes could be made to provide greater flexibility2. We 
consider below the case for changes to Teaching and Learning Responsibility 
(TLR) payments and recruitment and retention incentives and benefits, the 
main elements on which we heard concerns.
Background on existing allowances3
5.6 Allowances are a significant part of the teacher pay framework and for 
many secondary teachers (and to a lesser extent for primary teachers) make 
a substantial contribution to their overall remuneration, in some cases from a 
relatively early stage in their career. Our analysis of school workforce data shows 
that there are marked differences in the use of allowances between primary and 
secondary schools, and regionally. Detailed points from our analysis4 were:
•	 27% of primary and 56% of secondary full-time classroom teachers5,6 
received some form of payment in addition to their basic pay in 
2010/11.
•	 Within these totals, 21% of primary teachers and 44% of secondary 
teachers received TLRs. Significant numbers of main scale, as well as 
Upper Pay Scale, teachers held a TLR (see Figure 5.1).
•	 Other allowances received were Special Educational Needs (SEN) 
allowance, recruitment and retention payments and ‘other’ (unspecified 
in the data) payments. The use of recruitment and retention allowances 
was highest in Inner London.
•	 The values of TLR payments in 2010/11 were higher in secondary 
schools (median payments were £2,535 in primary schools and £4,286 
in secondary schools).
•	 The values of recruitment and retention payments were higher in 
secondary schools (median payments were approximately £1,200 in 
primary schools and £1,600 in secondary schools).
2 See Appendix D
3 We use the term “allowances” here to include TLR payments, SEN allowances and recruitment and retention 
payments
4 OME analysis of DfE School Workforce Census (SWC) data (November 2010)
5 Analysis restricted to full-time teachers as SWC 2010 earnings data are unreliable for part-timers
6 Teachers on the main or upper pay scale
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Figure 5.1
% of full-time teachers holding TLRs, by spine point, England 2010/11
5.7 Allowances accounted for a significant fraction of the paybill. Across 
England, approximately 6% of total classroom teachers’ earnings were related to 
allowances or payments made in addition to basic pay. This varied considerably 
across school phases (3% in primary schools, 9% in secondary and special 
schools). Around three-quarters of the allowance ‘spend’ was on TLRs (80% in 
secondary schools)7.
5.8 Our research8 found significant numbers of head teachers said TLRs, 
SEN allowances and recruitment and retention payments were not sufficiently 
flexible (37%, 24% and 25% respectively) and suggested changes including 
time-limited payments and greater flexibility on size of award. In response to 
an open question, over 60% of head teachers indicated that there were forms 
of reward or recognition they would like to use but were currently unable to, 
including one-off payments. Our visits to schools also suggested a significant 
appetite among school leaders for such flexibility and confirmed, as we have 
already noted, that detailed prescription contributes to the complexity of the 
STPCD and can militate against heads and governing bodies using flexibilities 
with confidence to enable schools to meet the particular needs of their pupils.
Consultees’ views and evidence on pay flexibilities
5.9 We received a wide range of evidence from consultees on pay flexibilities, 
much of which was put to us in advance of seeing the Department’s evidence. 
We noted in Chapter 2 that some unions had concerns with the existing 
discretion available to head teachers. NASUWT saw no evidence of a need for 
greater freedoms and flexibilities for schools to set teachers’ pay, suggesting 
there was a case for reducing flexibility and autonomy in the system. NUT 
suggested that increased flexibility would not necessarily lead to increased 
efficiency and was concerned that discretions reduced transparency and were 
7 OME analysis of DfE School Workforce Census (SWC) data (November 2010)












based on subjective judgements. Both NASUWT and NUT saw some discretions 
as having led to increased pay for leaders at the expense of others. BATOD 
remarked on a disparity between the way in which teachers of the deaf were 
paid in respect of SEN allowances and TLRs.
5.10 Other consultees argued that TLRs were unnecessarily complicated and 
restrictive and that greater flexibility and less prescription were needed in terms 
of TLR and SEN descriptors. NEOST commented that maintained schools 
would be at a disadvantage compared to academies if they did not have greater 
flexibility in respect of allowances (such as TLR and SEN), although it noted 
responses to a survey of its members showed two-thirds considered existing 
flexibilities were sufficient to manage recruitment issues. Whilst supporting the 
general principle of safeguarding, both head teacher unions proposed that it 
should be possible to pay non-safeguarded temporary allowances for leading and 
managing a specific time-limited project.
5.11 We explored in oral evidence sessions the case for time-limited TLRs. 
The Welsh Government, NEOST, NGA, ASCL and NAHT supported this but 
views from the classroom teacher unions were mixed. NUT, UCAC, and Voice 
said temporary TLRs could be appropriate for time-bound projects. NAHT and 
Voice both considered time-limited TLRs could provide incentives for leadership 
development opportunities.
5.12 ATL and NASUWT rejected time-limited TLRs and argued there was 
already sufficient flexibility in the value of TLRs that could be awarded: the 
distinct levels provided useful guidance on deciding rates. NASUWT stressed 
that TLRs were awarded for sustained responsibility of a core function and 
therefore saw no rationale for time-limited TLRs, foreseeing problems similar 
to those which had arisen with the former Management Allowances. ATL 
said it was important for TLRs to remain permanent to provide stability for 
teachers. UCAC was concerned that time-limited TLRs could be misused, with 
pressure on teachers to continue to fulfil the responsibilities when the duration 
of payment had ended. NUT was concerned about the existing flexibility in 
the payment of TLRs, the role of management in determining them, and the 
deployment of rotating TLRs. It sought an STRB review of the impact and 
effectiveness of the TLR system.
5.13 As we noted in Chapter 3, the teacher unions were unanimous in 
considering that the present framework offered sufficient flexibility already for 
recruitment and retention purposes but thought the provisions were underused 
for a number of reasons. The six unions (ASCL, ATL, NAHT, NUT, UCAC, Voice) 
suggested the use of recruitment and retention payments was to some extent 
constrained by funding considerations, but commented on the perception of 
fairness in the use of such incentives. ATL suggested some reluctance was due 
to the fact that school leaders recognised and valued collaboration in teaching 
and did not wish to undermine team working. NGA said schools needed up to 
date information on the local recruitment position to ensure suitable incentives 
were offered when necessary.
5.14 ASCL suggested the time-frames of the payments were rigid, which 
inhibited their use whilst BATOD, NEOST and Voice sought more flexibility on 
the period for which recruitment and retention payments could be awarded. 
ATL considered more clearly defined criteria were needed, but said additional 
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payments to encourage graduates of shortage subjects into teaching were not 
effective, suggesting instead that better salaries and conditions for all teachers 
and a level playing field for schools to compete for staff were needed. As noted 
in Chapter 3, a number of consultees suggested ways to encourage the use of 
recruitment and retention payments.
5.15 We received only limited evidence on SEN allowances. We recommended 
changes to these in our Nineteenth Report and need to understand how these 
have worked before making any further recommendations. We would welcome a 
remit to review these in future.
Our analysis and recommendations on allowances
5.16 Earlier in this report we set out our overall approach to pay reform, 
including the case for greater flexibility and control at local level. The Secretary 
of State’s proposals for greater autonomy imply that allowances for specific 
responsibilities or for recruitment and retention purposes might in future be 
subsumed into a single pay scale. However, we consider that, at present, the 
main allowances serve the important purpose of distinguishing clear reasons for 
additional reward for those who take on particular responsibilities or who have 
particular skills. Our priority in this remit is therefore to ensure the allowances 
are as useful as possible by increasing the flexibility available to head teachers 
and governing bodies to use these allowances to meet the particular needs of 
their school.
(i) Time-limited payments and TLRs
5.17 We considered carefully a number of options for time-limited payments, 
conscious that there was a strong appetite among school leaders for such 
flexibility, but also real concern from union consultees about the importance of 
preserving the core provisions for TLRs in the pay system. We noted NASUWT’s 
suggestion that paragraph 49 of the STPCD was an alternative way of providing 
for time-limited payments, but our view is that the section should remain 
focused on activity done out of hours or otherwise distinct from core school 
improvement priorities (such as ITT or helping other schools). We also think 
it preferable not to create a new type of allowance distinct from TLRs as this 
would complicate the provisions of the Document at a time when we are seeking 
substantial simplification overall.
5.18 We therefore considered how best provision for time-limited, or fixed-
term, payments should be incorporated into TLRs. We wish to preserve the 
arrangements that most consultees believe work well and therefore recommend 
no change to the core TLR provisions already in the STPCD, including the 
current values. We recommend that in addition there should be provision to 
pay a fixed-term TLR for a time-limited project. The fixed-term would have to 
be made clear at the outset and such payments would not be safeguarded. We 
recommend fixed-term TLRs should be awarded only:
•	 in a range between £500 and £2,500 per annum, as any higher level 
would amount to a significant component of salary and teachers would 
reasonably expect continuity of payment. Payment should be made on 
the same basis as TLRs (i.e. as a proportion of the annual allowance, 
paid monthly) for the duration of the fixed term. Such awards should not 
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replace the use of existing TLRs for sustained responsibilities which are 
part of the school management structure;
•	 for clearly time-limited school improvement projects, or one-off 
externally driven responsibilities (an example this year might have been 
the implications of the Olympics for an East London school);
•	 at the outset of taking on such a time-limited responsibility. They are 
not intended to be used as a way of awarding a ‘bonus’ on successful 
conclusion.
5.19 We emphasise that fixed-term TLRs should be offered for distinct, time-
limited projects. We do not expect head teachers to offer consecutive fixed-term 
TLRs for the same responsibility when a continuing TLR would be appropriate.
5.20 At present TLRs form an important part of the national pay framework 
and we see our proposal for new fixed-term TLRs as part of our broader package 
of recommendations to increase discretion available to schools to meet local 
needs. However, we consider there is scope for more radical reform of TLRs in 
future but believe there would be merit in looking again at these in a future 
remit alongside a review of leadership pay. Our recommendations above should 
therefore be viewed as part of an overall package that is the first stage in a more 
extensive programme of reform.
(ii) Recruitment and retention incentives and benefits
5.21 There is already considerable flexibility in relation to the level of 
allowances which can be awarded under paragraph 50 of the STPCD, but 
an absolute limit of three years on payments made at the recruitment stage. 
Payments for retention can (exceptionally) be extended. We heard evidence on 
our visits and from NEOST and Voice that there was a need for greater flexibility 
e.g. to make payments for longer periods than three years.
5.22 We agree such flexibility is desirable and indeed believe it increasingly 
necessary in the context of our recommendations in Chapter 3 which anticipate 
greater use of recruitment and retention allowances as a more effective way of 
responding to local market needs, including attracting shortage subject teachers 
and helping schools in the most challenging circumstances attract good 
teachers. We therefore recommend the removal of the 3-year time limit, subject 
to a formal review by the school of all awards on a regular basis. The expected 
duration of all recruitment and retention allowances and the review date, after 
which awards may be withdrawn, should be documented at the outset. Provision 
for such awards should be set out clearly in schools’ pay policies, and governing 
bodies should ensure decisions are taken based on objectively justified criteria 
and proportionate to the need. The formal review should consider whether the 
rationale remains valid in the light of changing labour markets.
5.23 We noted in Chapter 3 that several of our consultees had commented 
on the perceived under-use of existing provisions for payment of recruitment 
and retention allowances at school discretion and some evidence that these 
provisions were not always used to their full potential. We therefore recommend 
that the Department communicate clearly to schools the scope for them to 
make greater use of existing discretionary recruitment and retention payments 
available under section 50 of the STPCD to respond to local market needs, 
including case-study examples of good practice.
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Simplification of the STPCD
5.24 Our detailed recommendations for change are underpinned by our 
recommendation for simplification of the Document to enhance users’ 
understanding of the pay framework and the flexibilities available within it.
5.25 We had particularly invited consultees to comment on the case for 
simplification of the STPCD, having heard concerns about the complexity and 
opaqueness of the Document on school visits, which are confirmed by our own 
study of the Document.
5.26 A number of consultees shared our concerns about complexity. NAHT 
said the STPCD required an in-depth revision and it was sometimes a barrier 
to the use of flexibilities. ATL said that the pay and conditions framework was 
relatively simple to understand but considered the STPCD should be redesigned 
to give a better presentation. NASUWT thought there was no case for root and 
branch simplification of the provisions in the STPCD but accepted a need for 
some clarification, with examples of the use of flexibilities. We were encouraged 
to hear from the Secretary of State, in oral evidence, that he was confident that 
the Department would be able to produce radically reduced but tighter and 
more focused pay guidance.
5.27 Our assessment is that there is a strong case for a much shorter, simpler 
and clearer document which would enable teachers, leaders and governors to 
better understand how the teacher pay framework operates and the criteria 
for particular payments, including any flexibility which can be applied in 
appropriate circumstances. In our view a simpler, better presented document 
is essential both to underpin greater use of existing flexibilities and to prepare 
leaders and governors for greater autonomy on pay in due course. The statement 
on four sides in Annex A of the Department’s evidence would be a useful 
starting point for simplification – a point many consultees noted. Our package of 
recommendations, if accepted, will simplify the provisions in the STPCD, thus 
eliminating much of the detail. We recommend the DfE prepare a much simpler 
Document for publication in autumn 2013.
Summary of our recommendations on allowances and simplification
5.28 In summary, we consider there is scope for greater discretion for schools 
in the use of allowances. Our recommendations are as follows:
•	 No change to the core TLR provisions already in the STPCD.
•	 Fixed-term TLRs for time-limited projects, with non-safeguarded 
payments in a range between £500 and £2,500 per annum.
•	 Removal of the 3-year time limit for recruitment and retention incentives 
and benefits, subject to a formal review by the school of all awards on a 
regular basis.
•	 The Department communicate clearly to schools the scope for them to 
make greater use of existing discretionary recruitment and retention 
payments available under paragraph 50 of the STPCD to respond to local 
market needs, including case-study examples of good practice.




Our conclusions and observations on enabling 
pay reform
Introduction
6.1 In this report we have considered three distinct but related issues:
•	 making teachers’ pay more market-facing in local areas;
•	 more effectively linking pay and performance, including progression; and
•	 other reforms to raise the status of the profession and support the 
recruitment and retention of high quality teachers in all schools.
6.2 We now draw together the full range of our recommendations and set out 
how they will enable schools better to meet the needs of their pupils, rewarding 
those teachers who contribute most to pupil outcomes, responding effectively 
to wider labour market challenges, and providing flexibility to attract and retain 
good teachers, including in the most challenging schools. We comment on the 
capacity of the system to implement reform and, as invited by the Department 
in its written submission, consider the implications for governance and 
support arising from our recommendations. We make specific observations on 
performance appraisal, leadership and governance.
Our analysis and conclusions
6.3 The DfE’s proposals on pay reform posed the following important issues 
for our consideration:
•	 The future of the geographic pay bands, and the case for ‘hotspots’, 
which we considered in detail in Chapter 3. We recommend that the 
bands should be retained for now with increased scope for targeted 
use of pay flexibility to respond to highly localised, school specific 
recruitment and retention challenges.
•	 The scope for greater discretion to vary the pace of progression 
according to performance, better reflecting differential contributions. 
Our recommendations in Chapter 4 address this.
•	 Whether there was a need for the currently distinct pay scales 
for classroom teachers. We recommend in Chapter 4 a consistent 
progression path through the main and upper pay scales, based on 
performance against objectives and a single set of standards; and with 
much simplified criteria for access to the upper pay scale. We also 
recommend discretion for schools to create posts paid above the upper 
pay scale where appropriate to meet local needs. The latter will end the 
requirement for separate Advanced Skills Teacher (AST) and Excellent 
Teacher (ET) pay scales. We note the unqualified teacher pay scale 
already allows schools considerable flexibility.
•	 As a consequence of the above, we recommend discontinuation of the 
post-threshold, AST and ET standards.
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•	 The scope for reform of leadership group pay. We recognise the need 
for a consistent framework for leadership and classroom teacher pay. 
However, the evidence we received this remit focused on classroom 
teachers and we gave priority to reform of their pay framework. We note 
that performance-based pay is already in operation across the whole 
of the leadership group. Nevertheless, we recognise there is an urgent 
need to review leadership group pay and look forward in Chapter 7 to a 
separate remit on this issue.
•	 Whether to set a minimum and a maximum to pay scales. We consider 
the former is essential to enable the profession to attract high quality 
graduates. We recognise that, at present, the retention of a maximum 
on remaining pay scales is desirable to guide expectations and contain 
inflationary pressures. However, evidence of competitive pressures on 
starting and median salaries suggests a future review of the case for 
their retention may be needed.
•	 Whether separate allowances should be payable in addition to basic pay. 
We consider that some allowances form an important part of the national 
pay framework but there should be greater flexibility in the context of 
an individual school’s needs. Accordingly we propose in Chapter 5 new 
fixed-term payments for time-limited responsibilities and more flexible 
recruitment and retention allowances.
•	 The case for simplification of the STPCD, which we consider in Chapter 
5 and recommend action by the Department.
•	 The need to assure the effective and proper use of public funds as pay 
decisions are increasingly devolved to local levels. We comment later in 
this chapter on the importance of governance.
6.4 We endorse the case for greater autonomy for schools on pay as this 
should enable decisions which better reflect individual contributions and meet 
local needs. STRB has repeatedly stated the need for significant scope for, and 
encouragement of, local discretion and for national rules and parameters only 
when essential. As we noted in Chapter 1 it has been the consistent policy of 
successive Governments to devolve decision-making as a means of supporting 
school improvement.
6.5 In our view the models set out by the Department represent a continuum 
of change. The question is how far and how fast to make progress on greater 
autonomy on teachers’ pay. We noted, and considered very carefully, the 
strength of feeling on the part of many consultees about the importance of 
retaining a national pay and conditions framework: this was a consistent 
message from those representing classroom teachers, head teachers and 
employers and governing bodies, including those who sought greater flexibility.
6.6 Our assessment is that a staged approach to reform is needed, beginning 
with greater freedoms and flexibilities in relation to the core pay scales and 
allowances so that all those concerned can gain confidence in the ability of 
school leaders to use these flexibilities well. This should initially happen within 
a simpler national framework which will sustain the confidence of those already 
in the profession, and offer a degree of clarity on early career expectations 
for able graduates and those considering teaching as a career change. Our 
recommendations in this report focus on specific areas on which we have 
evidence of an appetite for change among those using the pay system, drawing 
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on what we have heard from consultees during this remit, the evidence base 
from our school visits, and independent research.
6.7 We recognise there is genuine concern among many consultees about the 
ability of some school leaders and governing bodies fully to utilise the range 
of existing flexibilities. We accept there is a significant task ahead to raise the 
capacity of the system to develop, and operate effectively, pay policies which 
allow greater flexibility at school level under a more autonomous model. This 
is not a reason to resist changes which will enable decision-making better able 
to meet local needs. But it underlines the need to match the pace of change 
towards greater autonomy with the capacity in school leadership and governing 
bodies to manage it well. We comment in paragraphs 6.14 – 6.27 below on the 
importance of helping schools build capacity to do this.
6.8 Autonomy on pay is in our view a logical consequence of the freedom 
introduced many years ago to allow schools to manage their own finances. 
As we noted in Chapter 4 there was considerable disquiet at that time that 
schools would be unable to cope with the change. The autonomy for schools 
to have control over their own budgets is now regarded as vital for the effective 
operation of schools to meet the needs of their pupils. Schools are trusted 
to recruit their own staff. We consider this must now be matched by clear 
steps towards further autonomy for schools with the local discretion on pay 
recommended by this report.
6.9 It is our view that all those concerned – teachers, school leaders and 
governing bodies – will need to gain confidence in operating more flexibly within 
a broad national framework before considering more radical changes which 
would move further along the continuum towards the greater autonomy which 
the Secretary of State seeks. It is also worth noting that an increasing proportion 
of schools now have academy status, which gives them the freedom to move 
more rapidly should they choose to, and the lessons of their experiences could 
help inform future steps on the continuum of reform.
6.10 We set out in Figure 6.1 how our proposals for reform (Stage 1) could 
evolve into a second stage of reform, subject to successful experience of 
devolved decision-making in pay and evidence of its effective use to support 
school improvement. This would enable embedding of the links between 
appraisal and pay progression; strengthening of governance; and consideration 
of a remit on leadership group pay and on conditions, before embarking upon 
Stage 2 reform. Any further reform would, of course, be likely to work best on 




Summary of our overall recommendations
6.11 As we have noted, this has been a challenging remit which has required 
us to examine a wide range of important issues. We have had in mind 
throughout, the guiding principles we set out in Chapter 2 and which are woven 
through our recommendations. A central theme has been increasing flexibility 
in a pay framework which is widely acknowledged to be complex and, in our 
view, unduly prescriptive. Our proposals simplify the framework and give schools 
greater autonomy to match resources to the needs of pupils.
6.12 At the same time, we have sought to reinforce the professional status 
of teachers, by ensuring the framework provides appropriate reward for good 
classroom teachers at all stages in their career and rewards excellence. Our 
proposals link pay progression firmly to contribution for all teachers; and offer 
scope for more rapid progression where justified, initially to the upper pay scale 
and subsequently, at school discretion, to posts paying higher salaries.
6.13 Our recommendations should be viewed as a package which, taken 
together, provide a better framework for reward to respond to local needs. In 
summary:
•	 Our proposals in Chapter 3 on retention, for now, of the current 
geographic pay bands, supplemented by greater use of (more flexible) 
discretionary recruitment and retention payments, offer schools greater 
scope to target reward as necessary (e.g. by role or subject) to facilitate 
recruitment and take account of school needs. This allows appropriate 
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responses to the different challenges of schools in close proximity, for 
example, higher salaries for teachers if justified by the challenge of the 
school, including in low income areas.
•	 Our proposals on linking progression better to performance and 
contribution (Chapter 4) will, prudently managed, balance greater 
autonomy and discretion for schools within a broad national framework 
to give confidence and clarity on professional expectations and clearly 
link pay to teachers’ contributions. This should support the best possible 
pupil outcomes.
•	 We also propose simplification of other aspects of the framework to 
enable greater flexibility in deployment of teachers to meet school 
improvement priorities, including (in Chapter 4) scope for school specific 
posts for the very best teachers (replacing the more complex AST/ET 
provisions), and (in Chapter 5) scope to award time-limited TLRs.
•	 We emphasise the importance of accountability arrangements, including 
transparent pay policies, which enable governing bodies to ensure pay 
recommendations and consequential pay progression are appropriate and 
within overall budget parameters.
Our observations on governance and enablers of pay reforms
6.14 In its written evidence the Department noted the importance of effective 
school governance arrangements and of support for governing bodies and head 
teachers in making decisions about pay which ensure probity and value for 
money. It invited us to:
consider the implications for governance and support as part of [our] 
consideration of the various options for pay reform1.
6.15 Experience of other organisations making changes to pay and conditions 
underlines the importance of effective performance appraisal, leadership, 
communication and governance as important enablers of change. We also 
note that our recommendations, if accepted, would give rise to a range of 
implementation issues, such as timing. We expect the Department will wish to 
consider these during the formal consultation process.
(i) Performance appraisal and links to pay
6.16 Although our remit does not cover the design of the teachers’ appraisal 
system, it is a pre-requisite of linking pay and performance that there is a 
trusted and effective performance appraisal system. The key task for the school 
is then to set out transparently how appraisal links to its pay policy, focusing on 
the ultimate purpose of appraisal, i.e. to improve teaching so as to enable better 
outcomes for pupils.
6.17 The new appraisal regulations in England have given schools freedom 
to develop appropriate local approaches, within a simple overall framework. In 
addition to working collaboratively with their teaching staff, to ensure appraisal 
is done well in schools, it will be important that school leaders’ and governing 
bodies’ efforts focus on the quality of appraisal with appropriate support, and 
accountability. In particular we observe that successful implementation of our 
proposals to link appraisal to pay decisions will need the following actions:
1 DfE (2012) Evidence to the STRB: the case for change: <http://media.education.gov.uk/assets/files/pdf/e/
evidence%20to%20the%20strb%20the%20case%20for%20change.pdf>
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•	 Individual teachers and their line managers should work together, 
initially to agree appraisal objectives and clarify what is expected and 
how they will be assessed. Effective appraisal should be a two-way, 
professional dialogue between the teacher and their appraiser which 
focuses upon how to improve teaching for the benefit of pupils. It should 
be a positive process involving reflective self-appraisal, as is the case in 
other professional occupations, reflection on professional development 
during the year and consideration of individual circumstances and 
needs. Appraisal should recognise achievements and identify specific 
support and development needs, include preparation of a plan for 
addressing those needs, and where appropriate cover future career 
development. It should be an ongoing process so there are no surprises.
•	 School leadership teams will need to develop systematic and transparent 
arrangements for linking appraisal to pay progression and set this out 
in school pay policies. They will also need to explain to teaching staff 
how these will operate – we comment below on the importance of 
communications and development for school leaders.
•	 It will be an essential part of head teacher accountability to submit the 
new arrangements in the pay policy to the governing body for approval; 
and to report subsequently on how their pay recommendations are 
justified under the policy. As part of this it will be important for head 
teachers to be able to assure the governing body that effective appraisal 
arrangements are in place. We note that the 2012 appraisal regulations 
(in England) discontinued the requirement for the head teacher to report 
annually to the governing body on the operation and effectiveness of the 
appraisal system. We consider teachers will lack confidence in the new 
system unless there is such a requirement.
•	 Governing bodies will need to consider the proposed pay policies and 
assure themselves that appropriate arrangements for linking appraisal to 
pay are in place, can be applied consistently and that pay decisions can 
be objectively justified.
6.18 As the above makes clear, it will be important that the appraisal process 
is robust and consistently applied within a school. We recommended in Chapter 
4 that the Department consider guidance or a tool-kit to assist schools in 
developing an approach to linking appraisal to pay. School leaders will need to 
be able to explain clearly how appraisal outcomes have led to pay decisions. 
It will also be important that individual teachers understand the basis for 
appraisal judgements (including assessment of their performance against 
national standards and locally-set objectives). The timetable for assessment and 
the types of evidence on which judgements are based should be clear at the 
outset.
6.19 In this context, we note, and welcome, Ofsted’s new inspection framework 
which includes, as part of its assessment of the quality of leadership and 
management, consideration of the robustness of performance management, 
including links between performance management, appraisal and salary 
progression. This underlines the need for governing bodies to be fully cognisant 
of their responsibilities in respect of teachers’ pay and performance. We 
comment below on the importance of appropriate governance of pay flexibilities 
overall, not only in relation to appraisal and pay recommendations but also in 
considering proposals for starting salaries of new teachers, for new responsibility 
allowances and for posts paying above the upper pay scale.
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(ii) Leadership and communications on pay reform
6.20 It will fall to school leadership teams, supported by governing bodies, to 
communicate the changes in the pay system so it effectively supports their core 
task of improving educational outcomes. We note that in large organisations line 
managers would have the benefit of, for example, centralised communication 
and HR advice. We are conscious that increasingly, schools use a variety of 
sources for HR support. It will be particularly important for:
•	 Head teachers to have access to appropriate support, including HR 
advice as well as more informal support, including collaborating in local 
clusters of schools to share good practice, where appropriate.
•	 Head teachers to ensure that the school’s pay policy is understood by 
staff, explaining the rationale for, and local benefits of, changes to the 
pay framework.
•	 Head teachers, and other line managers involved in assessment, 
to access appropriate professional development to ensure effective 
management of decisions impacting on pay.
•	 Head teachers and line managers to be able to explain the basis for 
individual pay decisions to teachers, including how these link to their 
appraisal and can be justified in the context of the school’s pay policy.
6.21 The Department will need to consider how best to ensure at national 
level that there is effective and direct communication with schools on the 
key elements of changes to the pay system to promote overall confidence 
in the system. It may also wish to consider whether action is needed to 
provide guidance for potential recruits on career and pay expectations and to 
demonstrate the possible career paths available and potential local variations.
(iii) Governance in the context of pay autonomy
6.22 We have commented above on governance in relation to performance 
appraisal and its links to pay decisions. It will also be important for governing 
bodies to ensure wider use of pay flexibility is effective and appropriate. We 
noted the Secretary of State’s fourth strategic objective was: to provide the best 
value for money for the tax payer and to ensure that the individual decisions of 
head teachers and governing bodies do not result in overall cost inflation in the 
system and that there are arrangements to maintain propriety in the system. The 
Secretary of State commented in oral evidence on the need for smaller, more 
confident and competent governing bodies. He also told us his Department was 
working with the National College for School Leadership to provide appropriate 
training for governing body chairs.
6.23 We noted a number of concerns in oral evidence about the implications 
for governing bodies of increased pay flexibility and devolution of decision-
making. NEOST and NGA both commented specifically on the need for 
governing bodies to have access to benchmarking data; and NEOST noted the 
need for greater attention to fiduciary duties. Most consultees said effective 
external HR advice for governing bodies would be crucial, along with appropriate 
training.
6.24 School governing bodies already have significant responsibilities in 
oversight of pay decisions. However, in our view, it will be a challenge for 
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governing bodies to move from the present position of pay recommendations 
based on an established national framework, with very limited discretions, 
to one of holding to account head teachers both for differentiated 
recommendations on pay progression; and increasingly for use of other 
flexibilities in the framework in relation to allowances. Governing bodies will 
need to develop effective mechanisms for support and challenge of such 
decisions, without undue bureaucracy or detailed involvement in judgements 
on individuals which are more appropriate to the leadership team. It will 
be particularly important for governing bodies to assure themselves on two 
considerations:
•	 first, that public money is being used effectively and with propriety; and
•	 second, that pay decisions are properly documented and objectively 
justified, individually and in relation to potential comparators, given 
the responsibilities of all employers (whether that is the governing body 
itself or formally the local authority) under equal pay legislation.
6.25 It is already obligatory for governing bodies to agree a school pay policy 
and they should ensure they are competent to consider the implications of 
pay decisions taken at school level. They may wish to consider steps to ensure 
they have access to independent expert advice, e.g. by collaboration with other 
local governing bodies; by ensuring that at least one member has experience 
of remuneration management from their professional background; or by buying 
in remuneration advice. This will ensure teachers and the wider public have 
confidence that decisions on pay reflect a teacher’s contribution and that finite 
resources are used effectively.
6.26 We believe further steps may be needed to ensure parents and the wider 
public can be assured that pay progression and wider pay flexibilities are 
responsibly managed. In the context of Ofsted’s responsibility for inspecting the 
quality of leadership and management we invite the Department to consider 
with Ofsted and other interested parties (such as the National Governors’ 
Association and NEOST) what combination of approaches would be most 
appropriate. In our view, this should include:
•	 Reinforcing the need for all governing bodies to review the school’s 
existing pay policy to ensure it adequately takes account of the changes 
to the system of pay and progression, including clarity on links to 
appraisal.
•	 Requiring head teachers to report annually to their governing bodies on 
the effectiveness of school’s arrangements for linking appraisal to pay 
progression
•	 Developing Ofsted’s inspection framework in relation to the leadership 
and management of schools to provide assurance that pay flexibilities 
are being managed in the best interests of pupils and with budgetary 
probity.
6.27 As we noted in Chapter 3, it will also be important that school funding 
reflects school needs to enable effective local decision-making on pay. In this 
context, we were encouraged to hear the Secretary of State confirm in oral 
evidence his wish to move towards a national funding formula in the next 
Spending Review.
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Summary of our observations
6.28 As we recommend in Chapter 4, head teachers will need to develop 
systematic and transparent arrangements for linking appraisal to pay and 
set them out in the school pay policy for approval by the governing body. In 
addition, we consider that the following will be needed to underpin the effective 
implementation of pay reform:
•	 High quality appraisal should be the norm in every school, with a two-
way professional dialogue incorporating a strong focus on professional 
development.
•	 School leaders should be able to communicate the rationale and 
local benefits of reform and explain how local pay policies link pay to 
performance.
•	 Head teachers should account to governing bodies for the effectiveness 
of their appraisal arrangements and the robustness of pay/progression 
recommendations.
•	 Governing bodies should build the effective oversight of performance 
appraisal, pay and budget management into their annual work round.
•	 The Department should consider developing a toolkit for schools 
on developing their own approach to appraisal and associated pay/
progression recommendations
•	 The Department should consider, with Ofsted and others, what 
approaches would be most appropriate to provide assurance on 




The teacher labour market
7.1 Teachers in England and Wales entered the second year of a pay freeze 
in September 2012. We expect a remit later this year on teachers’ pay from 
September 2013. In advance of this, and in line with our commitment to 
monitor trends in teacher supply over the period of the pay freeze, we set out 
below our observations to date.
7.2 Whilst many teachers continue to receive increments as they progress 
through the relevant pay scales, the pay freeze means that the last uplift of the 
pay scales for teachers was in September 2010 (the final year of a 3-year pay 
award which increased the pay scale values by 2.45%, 2.3% and 2.3% over 
the period 2008-2010). Many teachers (approximately 40%1), at the top of 
their respective scales, will therefore have seen no change in their absolute level 
of pay during the pay freeze period. Given recent prevailing levels of inflation, 
together with increased pension contributions from April 2012, many teachers 
are experiencing real terms reductions in their take-home pay.
7.3 In this context it is clearly important to monitor any impact on the labour 
market for teachers and we set out below our assessment based on the key 
data available to us. We will continue to monitor developments and will be 
undertaking a detailed review of the evidence, including that from consultees, 
as part of our next remit.
Future demand for teachers
7.4 It is important for us to understand the projected demand for teachers 
since this will impact on recruitment and retention requirements. We have 
examined the latest pupil projections data2 for England and Wales which show 
that overall, pupil numbers (aged up to and including 15) in state-funded 
schools began to increase in 2011 and are projected to continue rising. 
However, patterns vary across the key phases and regions of the country:
•	 The numbers in maintained nursery and state-funded primary schools 
started increasing in 2010 and are projected to continue rising. By 
2020, numbers are projected to be 18% higher than in 2012, reaching 
levels last seen in the 1970s.
•	 By 2015, all regions in England are projected to have an increase in 
their primary aged population compared with 2010. This ranges from 
around 9% in the North East and South West to 18% in London.
•	 State-funded secondary pupil numbers aged up to and including 15 
have been declining since 2004 and are projected to continue to decline 
until 2015, after which the increases in primary pupil numbers will start 
to flow through. By 2018, they are projected to recover to 2012 levels.
1 OME analysis of DfE School Workforce Census data
2 DfE (2012), National Pupil projections: Future trends in pupil numbers, July 2012
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•	 In Wales, primary pupil numbers are expected to increase by around 
13% from 2011/12 to 2020/21. Secondary school numbers are 
expected to decrease over the next three years, followed by a recovery 
as the increased primary numbers feed through to the secondary sector. 
The projections suggest a net increase across both phases of some 6% 
over the period to 2020/213.
Recruitment to the profession
7.5 We set out below the latest figures on recruitment to Initial Teacher 
Training (ITT) and are conscious that successfully recruiting graduates and 
career-changers to the profession will become increasingly important as the 
demand for teachers grows in line with the pupil projections. In this context, it 
will be crucial that the status of the profession is enhanced in order to attract 
a plentiful supply of high calibre candidates. It is with some concern that we 
note that the average number of applications per acceptance for ITT is around 
two, considerably lower than many other successful systems and arguably less 
competitive as a result.
7.6 In 2011, the target for entry to primary ITT in England was met despite 
being set some 6% higher than the previous year. The target for secondary 
teaching places in 2011 was 14% lower overall than 2010. Recruitment targets 
were exceeded in maths, chemistry and biology (and other sciences) but not met 
in modern languages (98% of target), ICT (96%) and physics (93%), although 
the number of physics recruits was the highest ever recorded. Contextual 
factors that may have contributed to the 2011 entry figures were reductions in 
bursaries, restrictions on TDA recruitment advertising and uncertainty relating to 
the EBACC and its impact on certain secondary subjects4.
7.7 We also note here the contribution of the Teach First scheme which has 
recruited 1,000 participants to start in the 2012/13 academic year and aims 
to increase this by a further 50% over the next two years. While the scheme’s 
participants represent a small proportion of each year’s new intake into 
teaching, it has played an important role in attracting high calibre graduates 
into the profession and, in particular, into many of the most challenging 
schools. We note in particular the healthy level of competition for places on the 
scheme with around seven applicants per place in 20115.
7.8 Over the last five years Wales has gone through a process of ITT 
reconfiguration, prompted by reductions in demand for newly-trained 
teachers. Following reductions in recent years, primary ITT numbers have now 
steadied and depending on the outcome of the Teacher Planning and Supply 
Model (TPSM) for Wales may start to increase in the future to accommodate a 
projected increase in pupil numbers. PGCE secondary ITT numbers were 
reduced for the 2012/13 intake and, depending on the outcome of the TPSM, 
may do so again in 2013/146.
3 OME analysis of Welsh Assembly Pupil Projections statistics published in School Statistics Compendium 2012
4 OME analysis of Teaching Agency data
5 Teach First (2012) Teach First Annual Review 2011 – Time for change
6 OME analysis of HEFCW circulars on ITT targets
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Vacancies
7.9 We noted in Chapter 3 that recruitment and retention, as measured by 
official vacancy figures appears to be healthy. Vacancy rates7 across England 
have halved over the last decade, from 0.8% in January 2000 to 0.4% in 
January 2010. However the method for collecting vacancy data changed during 
20108 and the headline rates were recorded as 0.1%9 for both November 2010 
and 2011.
7.10 The most recent data for England show little variation across regions with 
all headline vacancy rates being equal to 0.1% apart from Inner London (0.2%). 
The headline vacancy rate in Wales (using a different methodology) has been 
stable over recent years and was 0.4% in 201210. Using a broader definition of 
vacancies which includes posts being temporarily filled for up to year, there is 
greater regional variation but recorded rates are still low (the highest regional 
rate, in Inner London, was under 1%)11.
7.11 Using the broader definition, we note that in secondary schools in 
England, the subject with the highest vacancy rate in November 2011 was 
mathematics (0.5%), nearly twice the average across all subjects. Rates for 
Information Technology, Sciences, Languages and English were also above 
average12.
7.12 We are conscious that national and regional aggregate rates conceal 
localised variation and, as we set out in Chapter 3, there are a number of 
reasons for treating them with caution. The published aggregate figures cannot 
account for a number of factors. These include the use of non-specialised 
teachers and teachers on temporary contracts. Anecdotal evidence also 
suggests some schools have had to recruit newly qualified teachers, having 
advertised unsuccessfully for more experienced staff. Against this background, 
we anticipate that that the recruitment climate could become tougher as the 
economic cycle evolves, and the demand for teachers increases in line with 
forecast increases in pupil numbers.
Teachers’ earnings
7.13 In considering this remit as a whole, we have emphasised our view that 
teaching is a professional occupation which should aim to attract the best 
graduates. As such it is important that the relative position of teachers’ pay is 
competitive; both to recruit new people into the profession and to retain skilled 
and experienced staff throughout their careers. This is a view echoed in research 
on the approach to recruitment in the world’s top performing school systems, all 
of which recruit from the very highest graduate strata13.
7 Advertised vacancies for full-time permanent appointments (or appointments of at least one term’s duration). 
Includes vacancies being filled on a temporary basis of less than one term. Figures relate to all publicly funded 
schools
8 DfE introduced a new School Workforce Census in November 2010
9 DfE (2012) School Workforce in England, November 2011
10 Welsh Government (2012) Teachers in Service, Vacancies and Sickness Absence, January 2012
11 DfE (2012) School Workforce in England, November 2011
12 DfE (2012) School Workforce in England, November 2011
13 McKinsey&Company (2010) Closing the talent gap: Attracting and retaining top-third graduates to careers in 
teaching
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7.14 Our analysis in Chapter 3 showed that in 2011 teachers’ starting pay was 
broadly equal to the estimated starting pay of other professional occupations in 
a number of regions but lagged in several. We also noted that in Inner London 
starting pay was broadly competitive following previous differential increases to 
Inner London starting pay, but that some sectors paid higher starting salaries14.
7.15 Our analysis of median earnings across all classroom teachers suggested 
they were broadly similar to the estimated earnings of other professional 
occupations in some regions but lagged in London, the South East, East of 
England and East Midlands (regions which account for around half the teaching 
profession). We also observed patterns in the data suggesting that teachers’ 
earnings tended to be lower than other professionals in urban areas.
7.16 In this context, we also note data on 2012 pay settlements in the wider 
economy which suggest the majority of settlements in the year to date were 
between 2% and 3%15. This suggests that it will be important for us to continue 
to monitor earnings levels closely and to consider further how to ensure teaching 
remains attractive to graduates, both for career starters and those in mid-career.
Summary
7.17 While the published labour market indicators suggest that recruitment 
and retention to teaching is relatively healthy, we remain cautious due to the 
limitations of the data and the fact that aggregate statistics mask more localised 
recruitment and retention challenges, often relating to particular subjects and 
affecting individual schools. On earnings, the three-year pay award for teachers 
which ran from 2008 to 2010 was important in keeping pay broadly competitive 
with other professions, but our analysis here has shown that there are 
competitive pressures in some areas on both the starting pay and the median 
earnings of classroom teachers.
7.18 We are also conscious that recent conditions in the wider economy have 
contributed to a relatively benign climate for teacher recruitment and retention. 
However, greater challenges are likely to arise as the economic cycle evolves and 
the demand for teachers increases. Indeed, we note recent research16 warning 
of reductions in applications to teacher training and to localised challenges, 
including in relation to shortage subjects and leadership appointments. We will 
return to these issues in detail as part of our next remit.
Future remits
7.19 The Chancellor of the Exchequer announced in the Autumn Statement 
201117 that following the end of the two year public sector pay freeze, public 
sector pay increases would be limited to an average of one per cent for each of 
the next two years. We therefore expect the Secretary of State to give us a remit 
to consider teachers’ pay from September 2013. We would welcome a further 
remit to examine aspects of the existing pay and conditions framework that we 
have not touched upon in this report: leadership pay and non-pay conditions.
14 Earnings figures of other professional occupations are sample-based estimates, so carry some margin of error
15 OME analysis of IDS settlements data
16 Pearson Think Tank (2012) The Future Teacher Workforce: quality and quantity
17 HM Treasury (2011) Autumn Statement 2011, TSO (Cm 8231) paragraph 1.53
79
Leadership pay
7.20 The current arrangements for leadership pay are complex and the STPCD 
is opaque on leadership pay arrangements in particular. We commented in 
our last report18 on the need for a full review, a point many consultees have 
underlined in evidence this round. We note that recent remits on leadership 
issues have presented only limited opportunities to address the pay implications 
of the increasingly diverse range of school leadership roles, including where 
head teachers are accountable for more than one school. Having focused on 
classroom teacher pay this round, we emphasise the need for a consistent 
framework across the profession and would welcome a remit on leadership pay 
in the near future. This would enable us to consider properly how the current 
arrangements could be reformed to provide a simplified and flexible framework 
for ensuring school leaders’ pay is appropriate to the challenge of the post 
and their contribution to the school or schools. It may also be appropriate 
in the context of such a review to consider whether Teaching and Learning 
Responsibility payments remain appropriate for middle management posts such 
as head of department.
Teachers’ conditions
7.21 The Secretary of State did not provide any written evidence on teachers’ 
conditions for the present remit, although when asked during oral evidence he 
said that some of the current arrangements undermined teacher professionalism 
and believed they were matters for head teachers to decide. Other consultees 
commented on conditions as part of their written representations. We heard 
from teacher unions how much they valued the current conditions package, 
but also from head teacher unions that they sought greater flexibility in the 
application of certain aspects of teachers’ conditions within the STPCD, such as 
professional responsibilities and working hours. The Welsh Government felt that 
the current levels of prescription in the Document constrained leaders’ ability to 
lead schools, a point also made by NEOST.
Other issues
7.22 Subject to the Secretary of State’s response to our recommendations 
in this report, there may be other issues which it would be helpful for us 
to consider in the next or a subsequent remit. Given the wide scope and 
challenging nature of this remit we were not able to examine all the detailed 
provisions in the Document. If, as we hope, the Department makes early 
progress on a major simplification of the Document, this may reveal other 
aspects of the pay framework which would benefit from review so as to remove 
unnecessary prescription and increase the flexibility available for local decisions 
which meet local needs.
18 STRB (2011) Twentieth Report, TSO (Cm 8037) paragraph 5.6
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Conduct of the Review
E1 On 21 February 2012, the Secretary of State for Education, the Rt Hon 
Michael Gove MP, asked us to consider three matters relating to teachers’ pay: 
how to make it more market-facing in local areas; reforms to more effectively 
link pay and performance; and other reforms to teachers’ pay and conditions 
to raise the status of the profession and support the recruitment and retention 
of high quality teachers. We were asked to report by end October 20121 and to 
have regard to a number of considerations. The Secretary of State’s letter is at 
Appendix A. Our work to respond to these matters took place between February 
2012 and October 2012.
E2 We set out in the body of this report the wide range of evidence we 
considered, including international and research evidence; and reports 
commissioned by OME. We set out below the statutory consultation we 
undertook and a range of visits and meetings which informed our broad 
understanding of the issues.
Consultation
E3 On 22 February 2012 we gave the following organisations the opportunity 
to make written representations and provide evidence on the matters on which 
we were due to report:
Government
Department for Education (DfE)
Welsh Government
Organisations representing teachers
Association of School and College Leaders (ASCL)
Association of Teachers and Lecturers (ATL)
British Association of Teachers of the Deaf (BATOD)
National Association of Head Teachers (NAHT)
National Association of Schoolmasters Union of Women Teachers 
(NASUWT)
National Union of Teachers (NUT)
Undeb Cenedlaethol Athrawon Cymru (UCAC)
Voice
1 The original deadline was 28 September 2012; a revised deadline of end of October 2012 was given in a letter to 
the STRB Chair dated 15 May 2012 covering the Department’s submission, which can be found at: <http://www.
ome.uk.com/STRB_Correspondence.aspx>
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Association of local authorities
National Employers’ Organisation for School Teachers (NEOST)
Organisations representing governors
Governors Wales (GW)
National Governors’ Association (NGA)
E4 We also notified the following organisations of our remit on 
22 February 2012:
Agency for Jewish Education
Association of Directors of Children’s Services (ADCS)
Association of Directors of Education in Wales (ADEW)
Association of Professionals in Education and Children’s Trusts  (Aspect)
Board of Education, General Synod of the Church of England
Catholic Education Services for England and Wales
Her Majesty’s Inspectorate for Education and Training in Wales (Estyn)
Foundation and Aided Schools’ National Association (FASNA)
Free Churches Education Committee
General Teaching Council for England (GTCE)
General Teaching Council for Wales (GTCW)
Information for School and College Governors (ISCG)
Methodist Independent Schools Trust
National College for School Leadership (NCSL)
Office for Standards in Education, Children’s Services and Skills (Ofsted)
The Schools Network
Training and Development Agency for Schools (TDA)
E5 We invited the above consultees to respond in writing by 20 April 2012 and 
asked them to copy their submissions to other consultees. We gave consultees an 
opportunity to comment in writing on other consultees’ submissions.
E6 The following consultees made written submissions: ASCL2, ATL3, 
BATOD, DfE4, Governors Wales, NAHT5, NASUWT6 (including research it 
2 ASCL (2012) <http://ascl.org.uk/News_views/consultation_responses/ASCL_response_to_STRB_2012>
3 ATL (2012) <http://www.atl.org.uk/Images/ATL%20-%20submission%20to%20STRB%20April%202012.pdf>
4 DfE (2012) <http://media.education.gov.uk/assets/files/pdf/e/evidence%20to%20the%20strb%20the%20case%20
for%20change.pdf>
5 NAHT (2012) <http://www.naht.org.uk/welcome/news-and-media/key-topics/pay-and-conditions/naht-evidence-to-
school-teachers-review-body-april-2012>
6 NASUWT (2012) <http://www.nasuwt.org.uk/consum/groups/public/@press/documents/nas_download/
nasuwt_009767.pdf>
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had commissioned from IDS7 on local pay), NEOST8, NGA9, NUT10, UCAC11, 
Voice12 and the Welsh Government13. Six unions14,15 submitted joint evidence 
on market-facing pay including research they had commissioned from IDS16 
and from the Labour Research Department17 on local pay). DfE provided a 
submission on 14 May 2012.
E7 Six unions18 provided a joint supplementary submission on local pay 
in response to other consultees’ submissions. Four unions19,20 submitted a 
joint supplementary submission on performance-related pay. ASCL, ATL21, 
NASUWT22, NUT23 and the Welsh Government also provided supplementary 
submissions.
E8 We received submissions from the following organisations in response to 
the OME call for evidence on market-facing pay24:
•	 CBI
•	 Centre for Economic Performance (London School of Economics)
•	 Centre for Market and Public Organisation (CMPO) (University of 
Bristol)25
•	 Institute of Directors
•	 Local Government Association
•	 Mercer
•	 TUC
E9 We also received evidence submitted to OME from the Welsh Government, 
the Northern Ireland Executive, the Scottish Government and from a group of 
backbench Liberal Democrat MPs.
E10 ATL provided supplementary evidence on the IDS and IES research, 
the NEF research for the TUC and on the CMPO research report. NASUWT 
submitted supplementary evidence on the CMPO research report. The Welsh 
Government also commented on the NEF research for the TUC and on the 
CMPO research report.
7 IDS (2012) <http://www.nasuwt.org.uk/consum/groups/public/@press/documents/nas_download/nasuwt_009770.pdf>
8 NEOST is the representative body for employers of teachers in maintained schools in England and Wales. It draws 
members from the Local Government Association, the Welsh Local Government Association, FASNA, the Church 
of England Board of Education and the Catholic Education Service. NEOST (2012) <http://www.lge.gov.uk/lge/
aio/17199287>
9 NGA (2012) <http://www.nga.org.uk/getattachment/Resources/Consultation/School-Teachers--Review-Body/
NGASTRB190412.pdf.aspx>
10 NUT (2012) <http://www.teachers.org.uk/files/nut-submission-to-the-strb-april-2012.pdf>
11 UCAC (2012) <http://www.athrawon.com/uploads/STRB2012.pdf>
12 Voice (2012) <http://www.voicetheunion.org.uk/index.cfm?cid=902>
13 Welsh Government (2012) <http://wales.gov.uk/docs/dcells/publications/120423responsedigitalen.pdf>
14 The six unions are: ASCL, ATL, NAHT, NUT, UCAC, and Voice
15 Six Unions (2012) <http://www.teachers.org.uk/files/teacher-unions’-joint-submission-to-the-strb-april-2012.pdf>
16 IDS (2012) <http://www.voicetheunion.org.uk/files/pdfs/IDSreportMay2012.pdf>
17 LRD (2012) <http://www.voicetheunion.org.uk/files/pdfs/LRDReportMay2012.pdf>
18 <http://www.voicetheunion.org.uk/files/pdfs/JointSupplementarySTRB2012.pdf>
19 The four unions are: ATL, NUT, UCAC, and Voice
20 Four Unions (2012) <http://www.teachers.org.uk/docs/files/joint-union-prp-submission---may-2012-final.docx>
21 ATL (2012) <http://www.atl.org.uk/Images/ATL%20-%20supplementary%20submission%20May%202012.pdf>
22 NASUWT (2012) <http://www.nasuwt.org.uk/consum/groups/public/@press/documents/nas_download/
nasuwt_009771.pdf>
23 NUT (2012) <http://www.teachers.org.uk/files/nut-supplementary-submission---june-2012-final.pdf>
24 See: <http://www.ome.uk.com/Article/Detail.aspx?ArticleUid=43ac3584-4142-4883-aa81-7485c1a29970>
25 CMPO research report was submitted to OME after the deadline.
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E11 We invited the following consultees to make oral representations: 
ASCL, ATL, DfE, NAHT, NASUWT, NEOST, NGA, NUT, UCAC, Voice and the 
Welsh Government. All these organisations made individual representations at 
meetings in June 2012.
Visits and Meetings
E12 In total, STRB had 20 working meetings between 21 February 2012 and 
end October 2012. It held two additional full day meetings and two half day 
meetings at which it heard oral representations from consultees.
E13 The Chair attended a meeting with the Secretary of State for Education, 
Rt Hon Michael Gove MP, and attended a presentation by HMT for Review Body 
Chairs and Economists in February 2012. She had introductory meetings with 
General Secretaries of the following teacher unions and associations in February 
and March 2012: Brian Lightman, ASCL; Mary Bousted, ATL; Russell Hobby, 
NAHT; Chris Keates, NASUWT; Christine Blower, NUT; Elaine Edwards, UCAC; 
and Philip Parkin, Voice. The Chair also met Marcus Bell, Director of the DfE 
Teachers Group, in February 2012, and in March 2012 had informal meetings 
with Sally Coates, Chair of the Independent Review of Teachers’ Standards, and 
with Sir Michael Wilshaw, Chief Inspector of Ofsted.
E14 Between June 2011 and March 2012 members of STRB visited schools 
in the following local authorities:
•	 Waltham Forest
•	 Hammersmith and Fulham




E15 11 schools were visited in total: six secondary schools and five primary 
schools. In each school, members met groups of teachers and leaders to discuss 
teachers’ pay and conditions. They also met officials at each local authority. 
In Hammersmith and Fulham and St. Albans, the Review Body met school 
governors.
E16 In December 2011, STRB members met representatives from 
the Department for Education and Skills, Welsh Government, to discuss 
developments affecting the school workforce in Wales.
E17 STRB members attended a meeting with representatives from an academy 
chain to discuss its approach to pay in January 2012.
E18 In March 2012 STRB received presentations from Marcus Bell, Director 
of the DfE Workforce Group; and Stephen Hillier, Chief Executive of the TDA 
and invited Lord Adonis to offer a broad perspective on educational changes 
of the last decade, as part of a strategy day. The Review Body also received 
presentations from Incomes Data Services (IDS) and Institute for Employment 
Studies (IES) on research commissioned by OME in May 2012.
99
APPENDIX F
Generic evidence on public-private sector pay 
differentials, ‘crowding out’ and geographical pay 
differentiation
F1 Chapter 3 of this report on market-facing pay focuses on the issues of 
particular relevance to the teaching workforce. However we received wider 
evidence on these matters1 which is summarised only briefly in Chapter 3 and is 
set out more fully below for the record.
Public-Private Sector Pay Differentials
F2 The public sector comprises about one fifth of the workforce in the UK, 
or just over 6 million employees. It includes a very wide range of occupations 
which makes comparisons of average pay in the public and private sectors 
complex. Employees in the two sectors differ in terms of their employer size, 
occupational mix; gender balance; age; and level of qualifications. In relation 
to teaching, it is important to focus on the comparison with other graduate 
professions, a point we return to in our analysis. Some of the aggregate data 
quoted below is therefore of limited relevance.
F3 A number of studies have been carried out which seek to control for 
observed differences in workforce characteristics, and so aim to make like-
for-like comparisons between pay in the public and private sectors. These 
sources permit comparisons which account for the characteristics of individuals 
working in the public and private sectors, including: their age; gender; place of 
residence; and (where available) qualifications.
F4 The Office for National Statistics (ONS), using data from the April 2011 
Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings (ASHE), estimated a differential of 8.2% 
in favour of the public sector across all occupations2. Acknowledging that 
results from sample surveys are subject to a margin of error, ONS calculated 
that the differential was likely to be in the range 7.7% to 8.7%3. The Institute 
for Fiscal Studies (IFS)4, using data from the Labour Force Survey (LFS) for the 
two-year period ending March 2011, estimated a differential of 8.3% in favour 
of the public sector across all occupations. The differential for males was 5.5%, 
and for females 11.3%. IFS found that the differential varied for each gender 
across UK regions (see Figure F.1 below). Using a similar approach to IFS, HM 
Treasury5 estimated public sector pay differentials within regions and showed 
that these could sometimes be greater than between regions, although we note 
1 Responses to OME’s call for wider evidence referred to in this Appendix can be found at: <http://www.ome.uk.com/
Article/Detail.aspx?ArticleUid=43ac3584-4142-4883-aa81-7485c1a29970>
2 ONS (2012) Estimating Differences in public and private sector pay – 2012
3 The 95% confidence interval around its best estimate of 8.2%
4 IFS (2012) The IFS Green Budget: February 2012, Chapter 5 – Public sector pensions and pay
5 HMT (2012) <http://www.ome.uk.com/Document/Default.aspx?DocumentUid=61D57913-B95E-4F26-AFC2-
661297D266AC>
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that within-region analyses are subject to small sample sizes so must be treated 
with some caution.
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Source: IFS Green Budget 2012.
Men Women
Figure F.1
Estimated average public-private hourly pay differential across all occupations, by
region, 2009 Q2–2011 Q1
Changes over time
F5 ONS6 produced estimates of the pay differential across all occupations for 
the period 2002 to 2011. The overall differential in favour of the public sector 
was at its lowest in 20027 at 3%, increasing to 7.6% in 2005, then falling to 
5.3% in 2007. The differential increased year-on-year thereafter until 2011. 
IFS8 produced separate estimates of the differential for males and females for 
the period 1995 to 2011 (see Figure F.2). The public sector differential for 
females was significantly positive throughout this period. For male workers, 
IFS estimated that in the ten years prior to the 2008 recession, there was no 
statistically significant public sector pay differential, but that a differential in 
favour of the public sector across all occupations had started to emerge since 
2008 (reaching around 5% by the start of 2011).
6 Op. cit. ONS Estimating Differences in public and private sector pay – 2012
7 The earliest year in which ONS could perform this analysis on a consistent basis.
8 Op. cit. IFS The IFS Green Budget: February 2012, Chapter 5 – Public sector pensions and pay
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Year and quarter
Source: IFS Green Budget 2012. Dashed lines represent 95% confidence intervals.
MenWomen
Figure F.2


























































Distributional Differences in Pay Differentials
F6 As we have already noted, whilst the analyses of all occupations provide 
an economy-wide measure of relative earnings, it is important to understand 
that the aggregate findings may not be representative of specific occupations. In 
this context, the IFS analyses noted important differences relating to the levels 
of earnings (see Figure F.3 below)9. It estimated that the differential in favour 
of the public sector was largest at the lowest end of the earnings distribution, 
and that it decreased as earnings increased. It also estimated that, at the upper 
end of the distribution, the differential for males was in favour of the private 
sector (though not statistically significantly different from zero). IFS noted that 
this pattern had changed little over time. In its analysis, ONS10 suggested that 
graduates in the public sector earned less on average than their counterparts 
in the private sector – its analysis showed a pay deficit for graduates11 in the 
public sector of 4.1% in 2011 (and 5.7% in 2010).
9 Ibid
10 Op. cit. ONS Estimating Differences in public and private sector pay – 2012
11  Defined as employees whose highest level of education is a degree or equivalent
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Percentile in the conditional wage distribution
Source: IFS Green Budget 2012.
Bar heights represent the gap between the relevant percentile of the public sector conditional wage distribution and that
of the private sector. Red bars show the 95% confidence intervals.
Figure F.3
Estimated average public-private wage differential by percentile in the wage





























F7 In the Government’s generic evidence, HM Treasury, drawing on some 
of the above research, stated that there was an estimated premium of around 
8% for those working in the public sector compared with those in similar 
jobs in the private sector and that the level of the premium varied across the 
UK. It considered that one reason for this was that, unlike the private sector, 
there were few mechanisms for public sector pay to respond flexibly to local 
conditions.
F8 HM Treasury argued that the existence of pay premia suggested that the 
public sector paid more than necessary to recruit, retain and motivate staff in 
some areas. It said that this in turn limited the number of jobs that the public 
sector could support for a given level of spending and diverted resources away 
from other ways of improving the quality of public services. HM Treasury noted 
that there were likely to be differences in the pay premia between different 
occupations and that any changes would therefore need to be appropriate for 
each individual workforce.
F9 HM Treasury said that in places where private sector firms had to compete 
for workers with public sector employers offering a large pay premium, the 
introduction of more local, market-facing pay could help private businesses 
become more competitive and expand. It cited the use of zonal pay in the 
Ministry for Justice which allowed differential levels of pay for particular 
‘hotspots’ across the country, where recruitment and retention were more 
challenging.
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F10 The CBI echoed many of the Treasury’s arguments in favour of more 
market-facing pay, which it said would benefit both public and private sectors 
and promote jobs and growth. It said that the goal of hiring in the private sector 
was ‘hobbled’ by the public sector pay premium which established a pay floor 
at public sector rates for the wages a private sector employer could offer to 
compete for the best staff in less economically successful areas. The CBI also 
pointed to the example of the decentralisation of public sector pay in Sweden 
which they considered allowed managers to be genuinely flexible in creating 
posts and roles and allowing wages to better reflect local circumstances.
F11 The TUC questioned the validity of many of the public-private sector wage 
comparisons cited elsewhere. It stated that in large national organisations in 
the private sector, geographic pay was centrally organised and that national pay 
bargaining was more efficient than the alternative. The TUC also argued that the 
introduction of local pay would be likely to dampen economic growth and risked 
leading to an increase in equal pay issues. In July, the TUC also published 
research that concluded that moves to make public sector pay more market-
facing would result in substantial net costs to the economy.
F12 The Institute of Directors (IoD) cited a survey of 1,051 of its members 
and suggested decentralising public sector pay would be supported by business. 
The survey had reported that 27% of respondents had found it difficult to 
attract skilled staff at least once because of public sector pay levels12.
F13 The Local Government Association (LGA) reported that about 10% 
of councils determined pay locally and that even where pay awards were 
determined centrally there was considerable local flexibility in the positioning of 
roles within the local government grading structures.
F14 The Welsh Government questioned the perceived imbalance between 
private and public sector and expressed concern about the potential impact 
of local pay on public sector workers and the wider economy. The Scottish 
Government expressed similar concerns and stated that it would not be issuing 
remits on local pay to the review bodies in relation to devolved workforce 
groups.
The Impact of Pay Differentials
F15 OME’s wider call for evidence sought examples of where private or 
public sector employers have had difficulty in recruiting or retaining staff 
because of competition from employers of Pay Review Body remit groups. A 
recent discussion paper13 by Faggio and Overman considered the impact of 
increases in public sector employment on local labour markets. It suggested 
that the ‘multiplier effect’ of additional jobs may be offset by displacement or 
crowding out elsewhere in the local economy. The study found that public sector 
employment had no identifiable effect on total private sector employment but 
did affect the sectoral composition of the private sector.
12 Though the IoD did not specify over what period respondents had encountered this difficulty
13 Spatial Economics Research Centre (2012) The Effect of Public Sector Employment on Local Labour Markets
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F16 Academic research by Hall, Propper and Van Reenan, using data from 
1995/96 to 2002/3, examined the link between pay differentials and quality 
of patient care14. The authors found that hospitals in stronger labour markets 
with higher external comparator wages, showed worse outcomes in terms of 
quality and productivity. They concluded that wages that more closely reflected 
the local market in higher outside wage areas would improve outcomes and 
productivity.
Wider practice in geographical pay differentiation
F17 Research commissioned by OME from Incomes Data Services (IDS) 
on private sector practice15 updated previous research on this issue16. Nine 
detailed case studies were undertaken, focusing on large, multi-site employers 
with a range of professional and front-line staff. The sample included 
companies in retailing, financial services, transport infrastructure, distribution, 
manufacturing, communications and professional services. Key findings from 
the case studies were:
•	 Companies broadly used three different forms of geographically-
differentiated pay: location-specific pay bands/zones; traditional London 
allowances; or geographic differentials arising from the use of market 
data.
•	 Companies typically used a relatively small number of geographic zones 
for differentiating pay by location, ranging from two to five bands. They 
commonly used four bands (including national) and did not attempt to 
recognise small differences between labour markets.
•	 Firms set local pay centrally. The case study companies set great store 
by controlling pay, both basic and location-based, centrally. This was 
because of the need for tight cost control, a lack of confidence in the 
ability of local managers to manage pay, and the risk of inconsistent 
decisions on pay at local level.
•	 Geographical differentials were highest for the most junior staff and 
lowest, approaching zero, for the most senior staff.
•	 The recent trend, if anything, was away from locational pay 
differentiation. This was largely due to the lack of labour market 
pressures that would normally drive higher local allowances.
14 Propper. C and Van Reenen, J (2010) Can Pay Regulation Kill? Panel Data Evidence on the Effect of Labor Markets 
on Hospital Performance Journal of Political Economy, Volume 118 No 2
15 IDS (2012) Case studies on Geographically-Differentiated Pay
16 IDS (2008) Geographical pay differentiation in multi-site private sector organisations
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APPENDIX G
Teachers’ pay scales and allowances
From School Teachers’ Pay and Conditions Document 2012
England and Wales
Pay scale/spine/range minimum maximum
Main scale £21,588 £31,552
Upper pay scale £34,181 £36,756
Advanced Skills Teacher spine £37,461 £56,950
Excellent Teacher range £39,697 £52,090
Unqualified Teacher scale £15,817 £25,016
Inner London
Pay scale/spine/range minimum maximum
Main scale £27,000 £36,387
Upper pay scale £41,497 £45,000
Advanced Skills Teacher spine £44,540 £64,036
Excellent Teacher range £48,600 £60,993
Unqualified Teacher scale £19,893 £29,088
Outer London
Pay scale/spine/range minimum maximum
Main scale £25,117 £35,116
Upper pay scale £37,599 £40,433
Advanced Skills Teacher spine £40,433 £59,925
Excellent Teacher range £43,668 £56,061
Unqualified Teacher scale £18,789 £27,992
Fringe
Pay scale/spine/range minimum maximum
Main scale £22,626 £32,588
Upper pay scale £35,218 £37,795
Advanced Skills Teacher spine £38,493 £57,985
Excellent Teacher range £40,819 £53,212
Unqualified Teacher scale £16,856 £26,052
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Allowance minimum maximum







The Department’s response to previous STRB recommendations
Summary of STRB recommendations in the Twentieth1 Report Secretary of State’s initial response and relevant actions by the 
Department
Payment for teachers earning £21,000 or less
A non-consolidated payment of £250 be made in both years to all Accepted. Incorporated into paragraph 35 of the School Teachers’ 
full-time teachers on points 1-3 of the Unqualified Teachers’ scale. Pay and Conditions Document (STPCD).
The £250 payment be pro-rated according to their working hours for Accepted. Incorporated into the Section 3 guidance which 
part-time teachers on points 1-3 of the Unqualified Teachers’ scale. accompanies the STPCD.
The Department, as part of its consultation process, seek views on a Accepted. Secretary of State decided, having taken into account 
simple and cost-effective method of payment, and issue guidance as consultation responses, that the payment should be made on a 
appropriate. monthly basis rather than as a one-off sum. 
Limiting the value of discretions that can be applied to head teacher pay
There should be an overall limit on the discretions that can be Accepted. Incorporated into paragraph 12 of the STPCD.
applied to head teachers’ pay.
There should be a “base” ISR for a head teacher clearly defined The Secretary of State accepted the term ‘base’ in principle but 
in the STPCD and it should be the normal expectation that this he decided to not incorporate it into the STPCD. The Section 3 
remuneration covers the head teacher’s full role. guidance which accompanies the STPCD makes clear that the ISR 
should cover the head teacher’s full role. 
Any discretions above “base” ISR pay should be used only when Accepted. Incorporated into paragraph 12 of the STPCD.
clearly justified and the total of all discretions should not exceed the 





Summary of STRB recommendations in the Twentieth1 Report Secretary of State’s initial response and relevant actions by the 
Department
Governing bodies should ensure they have oversight of all the 
contractual arrangements and income streams applying to the head 
teacher.
Accepted. Incorporated into the Section 3 guidance which 
accompanies the STPCD.
It should be wholly exceptional to exceed the limit of 25% above 
“base” ISR, but where it is necessary to consider an exception, a 
business case must be presented to the full governing body, which 
must seek external independent advice in reaching its decision.
Accepted. Incorporated into paragraph 12 of the STPCD.
The Department re-draft the provisions in the STPCD to give effect to 
our recommendations, including in particular:
The Secretary of State accepted the term ‘base’ in principle but he 
decided to not incorporate it into the STPCD. The provisions in the 
Making clear it should be the normal expectation that the 
remuneration provided by the “base” ISR, as set out in paragraphs 
4.55 – 4.57, should encompass all the responsibilities of a head 
teacher, for example, the need to address improvement challenges 
in the “home” school and a wider contribution across the education 
system such as the sharing of good practice and liaison with other 
service providers.
STPCD made clear what was included in school’s ISR and which 
payments were discretionary and counted towards the 25% limit. 
Accepted. The STPCD made it mandatory for the governing body to 
obtain external independent advice.
Making clear the role of the governing body in considering wholly 
exceptional cases to exceed the limit. This must require the relevant 
committee to make a business case for the exception to the full 
governing body, which must itself seek external independent advice 
before making a decision on whether it is justifiable to exceed the 
limit and the amount of the total remuneration. There must be a 
clear audit trail for any advice given to the governing body and a full 
and proper record of all decisions and the reasoning behind them.
Seek better to align the structure of the STPCD so as to draw 
together in one place all existing discretions as they impact on head 
teachers and locate provisions on head teachers’ pay alongside 
statements on head teachers’ professional responsibilities.
The Secretary of State decided to take this forward in the next remit 




Summary of STRB recommendations in the Twentieth1 Report Secretary of State’s initial response and relevant actions by the 
Department
Consider what arrangements should be put in place to monitor the Not accepted. The Secretary of State said that the requirement for 
use of exceptions to the limit on discretions. the full governing body to consider a business case and to seek 
independent advice was sufficient.
Consider how to give effect to our recommendation that governing Accepted. Section 3 guidance of the STPCD was strengthened to say 
bodies should ensure they have oversight of all the contractual that the governing body should have oversight of a head teacher’s 
arrangements and income streams applying to a head teacher, e.g. by entire role and its paid responsibilities.
a single contract for a head teacher, overseen by the governing body.
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